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Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role:
"Sacred Space" in Corporate Takeovers
Robert B. Thompson* and D. Gordon Smith"
I. Introduction
Corporate law expresses a profound ambiguity toward the role of
shareholders. Courts announce that the shareholder vote is "critical to the
theory that legitimates the exercise of power.., by some (directors and
officers) over vast aggregations of property that they do not own."' At the
same time, shareholders have a very difficult time actually making any
corporate decisions. In this Article, we strive to define a new role for
shareholders in publicly held corporations by drawing on economic theories
of the firm and the structure of corporate law. More particularly, we examine
the role of shareholders in hostile corporate takeovers, the area where the
interests of shareholders and directors collide most dramatically, and
highlight a necessary "sacred space" for shareholder self-help, free of
directorial or judicial intrusion.
The dominant legal paradigm used to address the allocation of power
between shareholders and directors in the hostile-takeover context is derived
from the landmark Unocal case handed down in the midst of the 1980s
takeover wave.2 Unocal provides a judge-centered process to resolve this
conflict. When shareholders attack director-instituted defensive tactics that
prevent shareholders from responding to a hostile takeover, courts are
supposed to review the action under an "enhanced scrutiny" standard that is
more intrusive than the notoriously deferential business-judgment rule. This
proactive review is designed to ensure that directors are acting in the best
interest of the corporation and its shareholders. 3 The actual results of cases
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1. This passage is taken from Chancellor Allen's oft-cited opinion, Blashis Industries, Inc. v.
Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
2. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
3. To be precise, the Unocal court spoke of a board's "enhanced duty" rather than the court's
"enhanced scrutiny." Id. at 954. The court quickly modified its terminology in a subsequent case,
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986). and has
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decided under the Unocal standard reflect a much more passive judicial role
that seems to distrust shareholder decision-making and to prefer that of
directors.4 As the data in this Article show, Unocal and its progeny limit few
defensive tactics by directors of target corporations, and shareholders get to
decide very little. Judicial discontent with the current paradigm has risen
noticeably, 5 and academic commentary points out its deficiencies.
6
In this Article, we argue that the Unocal standard cannot resolve
shareholder-director disputes in a satisfactory manner. Unocal asks judges to
distinguish director-instituted takeover defenses that serve the interests of
shareholders from those that merely entrench incumbent managers. Yet
every successful takeover defense has an entrenchment effect, so this
difference is not likely to be one that a third-party judge will be able to
discern reliably. This is the kind of decision that the modem theory of the
firm suggests will be brought inside the firm to be decided by a governance
mechanism, not left to a third-party arbiter with insufficient information to
get it right.
Ronald Coase's classic work on the theory of the firm asked why some
economic activity was organized inside firms while other economic activity
was organized across markets.7 Current scholarship-in law, economics, and
finance-has coalesced around the idea that firms arise when contracts are
incomplete.8 Particular corporate constituencies (including shareholders,
employees, suppliers, and customers) are unable to write contracts that
determine future payoffs under every possible contingency. In the world of
incomplete contracts, third-party enforcement (for example, by judges) will
be difficult. Consequently, the parties may turn to an internal-governance
structure for making decisions when unanticipated contingencies arise, and
that authority usually should rest in the hands of those with the most to gain
(or lose).
referred to "enhanced scrutiny" ever since. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d
1361, 1373 (Del. 1995).
4. See discussion infra subpart 1(B).
5. See, e.g., In re Gaylord Container Corp. S'holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 475 (Del. Ch. 2000)
("Unocal's purpose and application have been cloaked in a larger, rather ill-fitting garment.");
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 317-45 (Del. Ch. 2000) (noting that "this case
unavoidably brings to the fore certain tensions in our corporation law").
6. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and
Shareholder Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffet, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 515-16
(1997) (criticizing the Delaware Supreme Court for using an "increasingly formalist statutory
analysis that reduces the scope of judicial monitoring of the board's fiduciary responsibilities");
RONALD J. GILSON, UNOCAL FIFTEEN YEARS LATER (AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT) 2-3
(Columbia Law School, The Center for Law and Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 177, 2000),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=235417 (contending that the adoption of
the Unocal standard has produced an inexplicable preference for elections rather than market
transactions to resolve control contests).
7. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMIcA 386 (1937), reprinted in R.1.
COASE, THE FIRM, Tm MARKET, AND THE LAW 33 (1988).
8. See discussion infra Part IL
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Both in law and in economic theory, shareholders have a residual claim
against the assets of the firm. But shareholders in a modem, publicly traded
corporation may not always look like what theory assumes residual claimants
would look like. Exit is easy, and incentives to invest in the management of
the firm are low. As a result, it is often said that shareholders "delegate"
their residual control over most business decisions to managers of the
corporation and retain certain limited rights to constrain management by
voting, selling, or suing. In turn, managers provide the hierarchy and cen-
tralized control to direct production and make an integrated assessment of the
assets that define the firm.
What has been overlooked is that shareholders seeking to exercise their
limited control over managers face a similar incompleteness of contract and
ability to rely on judges that led to the initial decision to bring economic
activity inside the firm. Contexts where directors lack a direct conflict of
interest or are not in a final period make it particularly difficult for courts to
respond to a shareholder's claim that directors are not acting in the
shareholders' best interest. In those situations, it should not be surprising
that shareholders would prefer a governance solution over a judge-centered
solution.
In place of a judge-centered solution, we emphasize the part of the
corporate-rovernance structure that permits shareholder self-help by voting
or selling when director defensive actions reach too far. We call this part of
corporate law "sacred space" in an effort to clearly carve out that part of the
decision-making space in corporate governance that is left to shareholders.
This approach not only provides a clearer way to address shareholder-
director conflicts in current takeover controversies, but also acknowledges
the change in the shareholder census since Unocal. With an increasing
number of active institutional investors as shareholders, these shareholders
are eager to decide for themselves whether a takeover is appropriate.9
By focusing on the role of shareholders, our sacred-space approach
looks somewhat different from the current Delaware judicial paradigm that
takes the directors' role as its starting point, but the two approaches are
necessarily related. In takeovers and other areas, corporate law allocates
power between directors and shareholders in a reciprocal manner. To the
extent that directors increase their decision-making authority, they reduce the
range over which shareholders have authority-and vice versa. The
implication of this insight, which is rarely made explicit in Delaware cases, is
that questions about the proper scope of board power could just as easily be
framed as questions about the proper scope of shareholder power.
9. As Vice Chancellor Strine asked in Chesapeake, "If stockholders are presumed competent to
buy stock in the first place, why are they not presumed competent to decide when to sell in a tender
offer after an adequate time for deliberation has been afforded them?" Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at
328.
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The Article proceeds as follows: We begin with a brief overview of the
theoretical space that defines the roles of shareholders and directors in
corporate governance (Part I) and provide a description of the statutory and
common-law structure of corporate law, particularly as it applies to decisions
in hostile takeovers (Part I). Part III focuses on fiduciary duty as the great
judicial workhorse used to address shareholder-director conflict and explains
why it has not worked in the takeover context. Part IV develops our
alternative based on shareholder direct action as a means to resolve takeover
disputes, a move we think is consistent with the current statutory structure
and modem theory of the firm. In Part V, we discuss how this sacred-space
approach would resolve current questions in takeover law, including issues
such as the propriety of "just-say-no" action by directors and the reach of
mandatory shareholder bylaws.
II. Shareholders' Role in the Theory of the Firm
In this section, we describe how the theory of the firm informs the role
of shareholders in corporate law. Competing theories of the firm strive to
answer several fundamental questions, as described by Hart and Moore:
"What is a firm? Why do firms come into existence? How do transactions
within a firm differ from those between firms?"'10 For purposes of describing
the role of shareholders in modem corporations, the boundaries of the firm
have less relevance than the functions of the firm. With respect to the
functions of firms, all theories of the firm hold that in certain circumstances
firms produce efficiencies over arm's-length market transactions, either by
economizing transaction costs or maximizing production. Our aim is to
describe a role for shareholders within the firm that maximizes those
efficiencies.
Our analysis draws primarily on three groups of sources: (1) agency
theory, which is usually associated with the work of Michael Jensen and
William Meckling; 11 (2) transaction-cost economics, which has been most
10. Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON,
1119, 1120 (1990) [hereinafter Hart & Moore, Property Rights]. Luigi Zingales writes of four
"fundamental questions": (1) "[H]ow an organization devoid of unique assets succeeds in acquiring
power that differs from 'ordinary market contracting between any two people' (quoting Armen A.
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM.
ECON. REV. 777 (1972)); (2) "[H]ow is this power maintained and enhanced, and how is it lost?";
(3) "[Hlow this authority-based system operates in a way different from ordinary market
contracting"; and (4) "[H]ow the surplus generated by the firm is allocated among its members."
Luigi Zingales, In Search of New Foundations 3-4 (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Texas Law Review) [hereinafter Zingales, Search].
II. See, e.g., Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Capital Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Other foundational pieces in the
field include Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory
of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael Jensen, Separation of
Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983); Michael Jensen, Agency Costs and Free Cash
[Vol. 80:261
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forcefully advanced by Oliver Williamson;12 and (3) property-rights theory,
which was first articulated by Sanford Grossman, Oliver Hart, and John
Moore, 13 and has recently been enriched by the work of Raghuram Rajan and
Luigi Zingales. 14 Agency theory has dominated corporate-law scholarship,
15
though not without substantial criticism)t6 Transaction-cost economics has
made significant inroads over the past decade, but the property-rights theory
has only recently begun to attract significant 
attention. 7
While all competing theories of the firm trace their origins to Ronald
Coase's provocative article, The Nature of the Firm,8 each offers unique
Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986). For early formal
explications of agency theory, see Bengt Holmstrom. Moral Hazard and Observability. 10 BELLJ.
ECON. 74 (1979); and Stephen Ross, The Economic Theory ofAgency: The Principal's Problem, 63
AM. ECON. REV. 134 (1973).
12. Much of Williamson's work is easily accessible in his books. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMSI; OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, TiE ECONOMIC INSTIMTTONS OF CAPITALISM (1985) [hereinafter wILtAMtSO,4,
INSTITUTIONS]; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKEIS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975). Other important pieces in transaction.cost economics include
Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, anti the Competitive Contracting
Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Paul L. Joskow, Asset Specificity and the Structure of
Vertical Relationships, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 95 (1988); Paul L. Joskow, Vertical Integration and
Long-Tenn Contracts, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 33 (1985); Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The
Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL ECON. 615 (1981);
Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Detenninants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, 70 AM.
ECON. REV. 356 (1980); and David J. Teece, Economies of Scope and the Scope of the Enterprise, I
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 223 (1980). For the first formal explication of incomplete contracts, see
Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical
and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL ECON. 691 (1986).
13. See, e.g., Grossman & Hart, supra note 12; Hart & Moore, Property Rights, supra note 10.
14. See Raghuram G. Rajan& Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 108 QJ. ECON.
387 (1998) [hereinafter Rajan & Zingales, Power]; RAGHURAM RAJAN & LUIGI ZNGALES, THE
FIRM AS A DEDICATED HIERARCHY: A THEORY OF THE ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF FIRMS (NBER
Working Paper Series, Working Paper 7546, 2000), available at http.//dlww.nber.org/
papers/w7546.
15. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991) (discussing agency costs and their effect on the structure and operation of
corporations).
16. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Lawv, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 259 (1999) (questioning whether agency theory affords any special
insight into the nature of corporations).
17. See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L REV. 1145 (1998);
Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self.
Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1634 (2001).
18. Coase, supra note 7. Williamson asserts that the origins of agency theory lie in the classic
work of ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). See WILIAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note 12, at 172. Although
agency theory speaks more directly to the separation of ownership and control than to other theories
of the firm, its proponents were clearly attempting to tackle the issue identified by Coase-namely,
why do firms exist and what are their boundaries? See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 11. at 783-
84; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 310-11; see also Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in
Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 311 (1993) ("[Tlhere is no doubt that [Alchian and
Demsetz's] clarification of the essence of the firm would not have been undertaken but for Coase's
The Nature of the Firm.").
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insights. Each of the primary theories of the firm relies on the contract
metaphor, though to different effect. Agency theory developed the familiar
"nexus-of-contracts" approach to firms. Both transaction-cost economics
and property-rights theory recognize that the firm has a role in resolving the
problems introduced by "incomplete contracts,"'19 but transaction-cost
economics relies on governance structures to resolve those problems, while
property-rights theory relies on ownership effects to resolve them. Before
exploring these theories in more detail, a bit of background is in order.
Modem theories of the firm developed in reaction to the impoverished
concept of the firm in neoclassical economics. Of course, prior to Ronald
Coase, no one suspected that the theory of the firm was impoverished. As
noted by Thomas Ulen, "If there was one topic that economists in the 1930s
thought that they understood, it was the economic reasons for the existence
of firms. Put briefly, the firm was a means of realizing economies of scale in
the production of goods and services. 2°  Williamson describes the
neoclassical firm as a production function, a "technology to which a profit
maximization purpose was ascribed.' Given profit maximization as the
goal, firms would be forced to pursue strategies dictated by markets-or
22perish. Under this view, price theory was the only requirement for a theory
of the firm.
Because neoclassical theory did not attempt to look inside the decision-
making processes of the firm, commentators often refer to this conception of
the firm as a "black box. '23 In 1937, Ronald Coase opened the box and
peered inside when he observed that some production is coordinated through
firms rather than markets:
Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is co-
ordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market.
Within a firm these market transactions are eliminated, and in place of
the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is
substituted the entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs production. It is
clear that these are alternative methods of co-ordinating production.
Yet, having regard to the fact that, if production is regulated by price
19. See, e.g., Hart & Moore, Property Rights, supra note 10, at 1122 ("We... suppose that it is
costly for agents to write detailed long-term contracts that precisely specify current and future
actions as a function of every possible eventuality and that, as a result, the contracts written are
incomplete and will be subject to renegotiation later on.").
20. Ulen, supra note 18, at 302.
21. WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note 12, at 365.
22. See Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Finn Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORO. 141, 143
(1988).
23. See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV.
713, 714 (1992); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 306-07; Richard N. Langlois, Contract,
Competition, and Efficiency, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 831, 834 (1989); Manuel A. Ultset, Towards a
Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 540, 551 (1995).
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movements, production could be carried on without any organization
at all, well might we ask, Why is there any organization? 4
Coase's article was famously neglected for two decades. Once
discovered, however, it led to startling new insights about the economics of
organization. Those insights coalesced around two issues: (1) the purposes
of firms and (2) the boundaries of firms. With respect to the first issue,
Coase suggested that firms exist to economize on transaction costs. With
respect to the second issue, Coase hypothesized that firms would integrate to
the extent required to take advantage of savings in transaction costs.
The first attempt to deal systematically with the issues identified by
Coase was the oft-cited article by Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, who
argued that firms were designed to solve the "team-production" problem25
Team production occurs when two or more people work jointly, and their
respective inputs are "unobservable." In other words, an outsider would find
it impossible to reward team members based on the quantity or quality of
their inputs for the simple reason that direct observation of each team
member's performance is impossible or prohibitively costly, or because the
inputs of one team member are indistinguishable from the inputs of other
team members.26 Alchian and Demsetz argued that shirking by team
members could be reduced by subjecting the team to outside monitoring.
Such monitoring would be performed by a principal, who specialized in
monitoring. The "monitor's" incentives would derive from the fact that he
was entitled to the residual earnings of the team.27
While their description of the residual claimant offered a potentially
powerful explanation for shareholders in the modem corporation,2 Alchian
and Demsetz were criticized on at least two points. First, as noted by
Masahiko Aoki, "it is vital for their argument to presume the principal's
24. See Coase, supra note 7, at 35-36.
25. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 11, at 783-84.
26. Id. at 780 ("In team production, marginal products of cooperative team members are not so
directly and separably (i.e., cheaply) observable:); L Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Optimal
Contracts for Teams, 32 INT'L ECON. REV. 561 (1991) ("The synergy that is the reason for the
team's existence may mean that an individual's contribution to the team's output is not
distinguishable, so that it is impossible to pay him according to his own productivity.").
27. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 11, at 781-82.
28. This assertion is made with hindsight of nearly three decades. At the time it was written,
the article by Alchian and Demsetz did not obviously describe the modem corporation. In that
regard, Thomas Ulen has stated:
The modem corporation is, by and large, a publicly-held corporation, and it is not at all
clear that the Alchian-Demsetz theory is an apt description of that corporation.
Specifically, the residual claimant of the Alchian-Dcmsetz theory is most easily
identifiable as an individual entrepreneur-for example, Andrew Carnegie or John D.
Rockefeller-in a closely-held enterprise.... To relate the Alchian-Demsetz theory
to those particular residual claimants requires another level of explanation, viz,, how do
common shareholders perform the monitoring function of the (individual) residual
claimant theory?
Ulen, supra note 18, at 312.
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perfect ability to observe the individual actions of team members, once
properly motivated. The perfect observability assumption, however, renders
the concept of teams almost meaningless." 29 Second, Jensen and Meckling
observed, "We sympathize with the importance they attach to monitoring,
but we believe the emphasis which Alchian-Demsetz place on joint input
production is too narrow and therefore misleading., 30  In other words,
Alchian and Demsetz overestimated the importance of team production.
31
A. Agency Theory
The emphasis on monitoring by Alchian and Demsetz places them
firmly in the tradition of agency theory, though the most influential piece in
this area was published four years later. Jensen and Meckling agreed with
Alchian and Demsetz in holding that the firm was not (as Coase asserted) a
pocket of productive activity where "market transactions are eliminated."
Instead, Jensen and Meckling viewed the firm as a "legal fiction which
serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which is also
characterized by the existence of divisible residual claims on the assets and
cash flows of the organization which can generally be sold without
permission of the other contracting individuals. '32 From this standpoint, the
boundaries of the firm are irrelevant because there is no firm in any
33meaningful sense.
This view of the firm dominated corporate legal scholarship for at least
two decades and need not be examined in great detail here. For present
purposes, it is sufficient to sketch the outlines of agency theory and describe
its relationship to the law of fiduciary duties. The central focus of agency
theory is the conflict created when one person acts on behalf of another.34 In
the context of corporate law, the directors are viewed as "agents" of the
shareholders ("principals"). The probability that self-interested agents will
deviate from the best interests of their principals will prompt parties in an
agency relationship to provide incentives for loyalty. Principals may monitor
29. Masahiko Aoki, The Contingent Governance of Teams: Analysis of Institutional
Complementarity, 35 INT'L ECON. REv. 657, 659 (1994).
30. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 310.
31. Team production has recently enjoyed a renaissance in corporate legal scholarship. Blair &
Stout, supra note 16.
32. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 311.
33. Jensen and Meckling argue that
[i]t makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things which are "inside" the
firm ... from those things that are "outside" of it. There is in a very real sense only a
multitude of complex relationships (i.e., contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm)
and the owners of labor, material and capital inputs and the consumers of output.
Id.
34. In the words of Jensen and Meckling, an agency relationship is "a contract under which one
or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on
their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent." Id. at 308,
268 [Vol. 80:261
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agents, or agents may bond their own performance. In either event, the
parties will not be able to align the agent's performance perfectly with the
principal's preferences, and any divergences are referred to as residual loss.
Taken together the monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual losses are
the total agency costs of the relationship.35
For many, the function of corporate law is to minimize the total agency
costs inherent in the relationship between directors and shareholders. Of
course, corporate law would be unnecessary if directors and shareholders
could write complete contracts. 36 Some gaps in corporate "contracts" are
filled by governance mechanisms (most importantly, shareholder voting),
and other gaps are filled by the law of fiduciary duties.37 Our task in this
paper is to distinguish between them.
B. Transaction-Cost Economics
The unit of analysis in transaction-cost economics is the transaction.
The goal of transaction-cost economics is easily stated: align transactions
with governance structures in a manner that minimizes transaction costs.
Realization of this goal is a bit more complex, but the relevant features of
transaction-cost economics are relatively accessible.
Transaction-cost analysis is founded on two behavioral assumptions:
"bounded rationality" and "opportunism." Bounded rationality is the notion
that actors strive to act rationally, but are simply incapable of fulfilling the
requirements of strict rationality because of limited information and limited
ability to process information. Opportunism is familiar from agency theory,
but Williamson offers the most commonly quoted definition: "self-interest
seeking with guile."38  He elaborates that this "includes but is scarcely
limited to more blatant forms, such as lying, stealing, and cheating.
Opportunism more often involves subtle forms of deceit."39 Transactions are
examined along three dimensions: asset specificity, ° frequency, and
uncertainty. Where transaction costs are high, the relationships are brought
inside the firm subject to its hierarchy and internal governance. Within the
corporation, the board of directors is viewed as a governance instrument of
shareholders, an instrument "whose principal purpose is to safeguard those
35. Id.
36. Although incomplete contracts are not central to agency theory, the existence of incomplete
contracts suggests that monitoring and bonding will be accomplished by governance mechanisms,
and agency theory does not reject that implication. As a result, agency theory and the other theories
of the firm are complementary.
37. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 15, at 90 ("If contracts can be written in
enough detail, there is no need for 'fiduciary' duties....").
38. WILUAMSON, INsTrrTrONS, supra note 12, at 47.
39. Id.
40. Williamson has helpfully defined "asset specificity" to mean "[a] specialized investment
that cannot be redeployed to alternative uses or by alternative users except at a loss of productive
value." WIIAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note 12, at 377.
2001]
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who face a diffuse but significant risk of expropriation because the assets in
question are numerous and ill-defined, and cannot be protected in a well-
focused, transaction-specific way.
'Al
C. Property-Rights Theory
Property-rights theorists argue that the key to understanding the nature
of firms is to focus on assets.42 Given the inevitability of incomplete
contracts, 43 ownership-defined as the residual right to control assets---will
determine the decisions made in situations that are outside of any existing
contracts. When ownership relates to specialized assets, it leads to control
over human capital. 45
Under this view, decision-making within the firm is determined by
ownership because owners have power. Firms are created when the exercise
of such power produces efficiencies. Stated differently, firms solve the
problems posed by incomplete contracts, but not by reducing transaction
costs. Rather, firms solve those problems by encouraging the appropriate
level of relationship-specific investment.46 As noted by Hart and Moore,
"The driving force behind all our results is the idea that agents underinvest
because some of the benefits from their investment are dissipated in future
bargaining. Assets are allocated so as to mitigate this underinvestment."
47
Recent work by Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales follows in the
tradition of Hart and Moore, but identifies a source of power distinct from
ownership. Under this view, power emanates from the right to control access
to assets, including human capital. "Access" is broadly defined to mean "the
41. Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1210 (1984).
42. Hart and Moore focused on physical assets, but noted that "the ideas may generalize to
intangible assets such as goodwill." Hart & Moore, Property Rights, supra note 10, at 1150. They
conclude:
Some nonhuman assets are essential for the argument, however, and in fact we suspect
that they are an important ingredient of any theory of the firm. The reason is that in the
absence of any nonhuman assets, it is unclear what authority or control means,
Authority over what? Control over what?
Id.
43. As noted, if parties could negotiate complete contingent contracts, firms would be
unnecessary. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
44. Hart & Moore, Property Rights, supra note 10, at 1120 ("[Wle identify a firm with the
assets it possesses and take the position that ownership confers residual rights of control over the
firm's assets: the right to decide how these assets are to be used except to the extent that particular
usages have been specified in an initial contract.").
45. Id. at 1121 (explaining that one's bargaining position with laborers is strengthened through
control of the assets that they use).
46. In describing the property-rights theory of the firm, Rajan and Zingales state that "[the role
power plays within the firm is to foster and protect relationship-specific investments." Rajan &
Zingales, Power, supra note 14, at 387.
47. Hart & Moore, Property Rights, supra note 10, at 1151.
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ability to use, or work with, a critical resource." 48 Why is access important?
According to Rajan and Zingales, access determines how specific
investments are made:
The agent who is given privileged access to the resource gets no nell'
residual rights of control. All she gets is the opportunity to specialize
her human capital to the resource and make herself valuable. When
combined with her preexisting residual right to withdraw her human
capital, access gives her the ability to create a critical resource that she
controls: her specialized human capital.
49
This "critical-resource" theory of the firm was partly inspired by
shortcomings of the property-rights theory, including what Rajan and
Zingales refer to as the "adverse effect of ownership." ° They argue that
ownership can actually reduce the incentive to make relationship-specific
investments.5 1 The intuition behind this conclusion is easy to understand-
specialization may foreclose alternative uses of an asset, and these
opportunity costs reduce the incentive to make the specialized investments
that characterize the firm.
52
Critical-resource theory provides a powerful explanation for the
structure of modem, publicly traded corporations. Rajan and Zingales
suggest that the adverse effects of ownership and the positive effects of
access combine to argue for placing ownership in the hands of a "third party"
who is not involved in the production process.5 3 This largely passive owner
"could delegate many of the powers of ownership that are unlikely to be
misused to a managerial hierarchy [and] will retain the power to fire the
production team (or the managing hierarchy) from the assets if it does not
specialize." s4
D. Comparing the Theories of the Finn
As noted by Oliver Williamson, agency theory and transaction-cost
economics are "mainly complementary." 55 For example, both rely heavily on
48. Rajan & Zingales, Power, supra note 14, at 388. The authors elaborate on the basic
definition as follows: "If the critical resource is a machine, access implies the ability to operate the
machine; if the resource is an idea, access implies being exposed to the details of the idea; if the
resource is a person, access is the ability to work closely with the person." Id.
49. Id. at 388.
50. Id. at 406.
51. Id.
52. Rajan and Zingales identify two other shortcomings. First, ownership by one agent may in
some circumstances "crowd out" incentives to invest by other agents. Second, the property-rights
theory involves a limited supply of ownership-if the number of agents who require incentives is
great, there may not be enough ownership rights to go around. Id. at 406-07.
53. Id. at 422.
54. Id.
55. Wn.UAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note 12, at 171. In his comparison of the two theories,
Williamson notes that both come in two varieties. Formal work in agency theory is preoccupied
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the concept of opportunism (often referred to as "moral hazard" in the
agency literature). Moreover, both theories accept the notion of bounded
rationality.56 Thus, the "behavioral assumptions" on which each theory is
based are virtually identical.
According to Williamson, the primary difference between transaction-
cost economics and agency theory lies in the unit of analysis. While the
former examines transactions, the latter concentrates on agents.57 This
difference in focus leads to a difference in approach that is crucial to our
project, namely, that agency theory is primarily concerned with ex ante
incentive alignment (of the agent and the principal) whereas transaction-cost
economics is primarily concerned with ex post governance.5" This
difference, in turn, has implications for the respective roles of private and
court ordering. In Williamson's words:
Rather than assume that disputes are routinely submitted to and
efficaciously settled by courts, [transaction-cost economics] maintains
that court ordering is a very crude instrument and that most disputes,
including many that under current rules could be brought to a court,
[can be] resolved by avoidance, self help and the like.59
Like agency theory, property-rights theory and transaction-cost
economics are "highly complementary. '' 6° According to Edward Rock and
Michael Wachter, "[t]he critical insight shared by these approaches.., is that
contracting will inevitably be highly incomplete."61  Nevertheless, the
implications of incomplete contracts are dramatically different. In
transaction-cost economics, the combination of incomplete contracts and
opportunism leads to a focus on ex post contracting problems. Even if the
with questions relating to "mechanism design," while less formal work focuses on monitoring and
bonding in contracts organizations ("positive theory of agency"). Transaction-cost economics may
be divided into "measurement" and "governance." Williamson compares the positive theory of
agency with the governance theory of transaction-cost economics. Id. at 172.
56. This is a more recent development in agency theory.
57. WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note 12, at 175.
58. See id. at 176 (stating that reducing costs "through judicious choice of governance structure
(market, hierarchy, or hybrid), rather than merely realigning incentives and pricing them out, is the
distinctive... orientation" of transaction-cost economics).
59. Id. at 176-77 (citation omitted). This is not to suggest that courts are always
counterproductive. To the contrary, Williamson acknowledges that the "availability of the courts to
serve as a forum of ultimate appeal... serves to delimit the range of indeterminacy within which
private ordering bargains must be reached." Id. at 177.
60. Rock & Wachter, supra note 17, at 1630; see also Hart & Moore, Property Rights, supra
note 10, at 1120 (stating that their analysis is consistent with Williamson's prior work in
transaction-cost economics).
61. Rock & Wachter, supra note 17, at 1630. In the interest of giving credit where credit is
due, however, we note that on this point the theorists of the firms were inspired by the writings of a
law professor, Ian Macneil, who pioneered the notion of "relational contracts." See WILLIAMSON,
MECHANISMS, supra note 12, at 355 (noting that Macneil's treatment of contracts in his article The
Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974) was "much more expansive, nuanced,
and interdisciplinary (mainly combining law and sociology) than any I had seen previously").
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parties were not subject to information asymmetries, Williamson argues,
"costly maladaptation and ex post bargaining" are possible 2 By contrast,
the property-rights theorists assume costless bargaining will lead to efficient
results ex post; therefore, property-rights theory focuses on ex ante
-- r63
contracting.
E. The Shareholders' Role in Corporate Law
For all of the attention that they receive, shareholders are still slighted
by the theory of the firm. Whether because of "rational apathyE or lack of
business expertise,65 shareholders are inevitably cast as passive constituents
of the firm. While they nominally possess residual control rights of the
publicly held firm, actual control is said to reside in the managers.6 Our task
is to examine more closely the division of power between directors and
shareholders. In this endeavor, generalizations about the "delegation" of
control rights from shareholders to directors are inadequate.
Agency theorists leave surprisingly little to the shareholders.
"Surprising" because agency theory is erected on the notion that a principal
(the shareholders) monitors an agent (the managers). Nevertheless, agency
theory routinely invokes the power of markets to "monitor" managers, thus
supplanting the shareholders. For example, in their survey of corporate
governance, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny assert that "product market
competition is probably the most powerful force toward economic efficiency
in the world" 67 and that "[tiakeovers are widely interpreted as the critical
corporate-governance mechanism in the United States, without which
62. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, WHY LAW, ECONOMICS, AND ORGANIZATION? 6 (UC Berkeley
Public Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 37, 2000), available at http'J/papers.ssrn.com/
paper.tafabstract_id=255624.
63. Hart & Moore, Property Rights, supra note 10, at 1152. Williamson argues that the
"assumption of costless bargaining is a preposterous simplification." WILIAMSOx, supra note 62,
at 6 n.5.
64. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 337-38; see also ANTHONY DOVNS, AN
ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 260-76 (1957) (discussing "rational apathy" in the context of
an election within a democratic political system); MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION 55-56 (2d ed. 1971) (arguing that individual shareholders have no incentive to challenge
inept or corrupt management).
65. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J.
FIN. 737, 741 (1997). In the course of explaining how lack of business expertise renders
shareholders passive and gives managers actual control, Shlcifer and Vishny discuss the following
hypothetical situation:
In principle, one could imagine a contract in which the financiers give funds to the
manager on the condition that they retain all the residual control rights. Any time
something unexpected happens, they get to decide what to do. But this does not quite
work, for the simple reason that the financiers are not qualified or informed enough to
decide what to do-the very reason they hired the manager in the first place.
Id.
66. Id. ("The fact is that managers do have most of the residual control rights.").
67. Id. at738.
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managerial discretion cannot be effectively controlled. 68  When these
market mechanisms fail, shareholders may sue. Voting is viewed as
important, but not terribly effective in most contexts 69; therefore, the domain
of shareholder self-help under this view is limited.
Property-rights theory provides less guidance than agency theory on the
role of shareholders in corporate governance. Hart and Moore assert that
shareholders have the residual right to control assets, which they define as
"the right to decide how these assets are to be used except to the extent that
particular usages have been specified in an initial contract."7 Within this
definition lie the seeds of confusion for those attempting to delineate the
respective roles of shareholders and directors. While it is widely accepted
that shareholders have the residual right of control over a corporation,7' it is
equally well-established that shareholders "delegate" some of those control
rights to the board of directors. Incorporation subjects the assets of the firm
to the default rules of the corporation statute, which empowers the board of
directors with management authority over the firm.72 In many of the most
difficult problems in corporate law (including the allocation of control rights
when facing a hostile-takeover bid), the issue is whether directors or
shareholders should have decision-making power. Suggesting that share-
holders have decision-making power "except to the extent that particular
usages have been specified in an initial contract" begs the question: what
68. Id. at 756 (footnote omitted).
69. Id. at 750-51 ("The most important legal right shareholders have is the right to vote on
important corporate matters [but voting is] expensive to exercise and enforce.").
70. Hart & Moore, Property Rights, supra note 10, at 1120.
71. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 16, at 263 (noting that "the shareholder/owners at the
top of the pyramid have been understood to be the residual claimants to all profits left over after all
the corporation's contractual obligations have been met"); Zingales, Search, supra note 10, at 14,
see also Hart & Moore, Property Rights, supra note 10, at 1121 n.3 ("It should be emphasized that
the approach taken in this paper... distinguishes between ownership in the sense of possession of
residual control rights over assets and ownership in the sense of entitlement to an asset's (verifiable)
profit stream. In practice, these rights over assets will often go together, but they do not have to.").
72. Grossman & Hart, supra note 12, at 694 ("In a corporation the shareholders as a group have
control and delegate this control to the board of directors (i.e., management)."). On the issue of
delegation, see George Baker et al., InformalAuthority in Organizations, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORO. 56,
56 (1999):
Authority is the defining feature of hierarchy. The boss can restrict the subordinate's
actions, overturn his decisions, and even fire him (unless the boss's boss objects, in
which case the boss herself may be fired). Tracing this chain of authority up the
hierarchy, we eventually reach a person (sole proprietor) or group (shareholders) who
can be thought of as owning all the decision rights in the organization. In short, formal
authority resides at the top.
Of course, few organizations are run by tyrants who actively exercise their ownership of all the
decision rights in the organization. To the contrary, many middle managers wield substantial
authority. But we assert that such authority is always informal, in the sense that it can be retracted
by those higher up the hierarchy, ultimately by those at the top who hold formal authority. That is,
we see all subordinates' decision rights as loaned, not owned.
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usages have been specified in the initial contract (that is, the statutory default
rules)? On this issue, Hart and Moore provide no explicit guidance."
Transaction-cost economics appears more helpful in defining the
shareholder role because of its emphasis on ex post governance of the firm.
Under this view, the statutory default rules are not complete contingent
contracts, but governance mechanisms. Even as governance mechanisms,
however, the statutory default rules are incomplete because they do not
precisely specify the decision-making roles of directors, shareholders, and
courts. In the face of such uncertainty, we agree with Williamson that "court
ordering is a very crude instrument" and that some disputes are best resolved
by shareholder self-help. 74 Yet unbridled shareholder decision-making can
adversely affect the firm.7s As a result, we conclude that shareholders should
act without interference from directors or courts in a narrowly defined range
of circumstances, which we call "sacred space."
Il. The Legal Structure: Corporate Governance and the Role of Judges
Corporate law is much more specific than most theory-of-the-firm
discussions in detailing the relative roles of shareholders and directors within
corporations. Yet the broad outlines of the statutory structure parallel one of
the central teachings from the theory of the firm just discussed: some role for
shareholders is essential, but too much shareholder control can adversely
affect the firm. In this part we focus not just on the roles of these groups, but
also on the central role of judges in resolving disputes between shareholders
and directors. In the next two parts we explore how judge-centered share-
holder litigation has failed in the takeover setting and suggest a focus on the
other shareholder functions of voting and selling that have been
overshadowed since UnocaL
Corporate law provides a business form that intentionally centralizes
almost all corporate power in one subgroup of the enterprise, the board of
directors. Section 141 of the Delaware Code is an explicit statement of this
choice,76 and counterparts are found in the corporation statute of every other
73. Commenting on the decision by Hart and Moore to identify power inside the firm with
ownership, Zingales rightly observes, "Not surprisingly this line of research has found it extremely
difficult to deal with the separation between ownership and control:' Zingales, Search, supra note
10, at 23.
74. See Rajan & Zingales, Power, supra note 14, at 424 ('[Slhareholders. precisely because of
their remoteness from the production process, may be in a better position [than other stakeholders]
to make decisions that are in the best interests of the firm.").
75. See Andrei Sheifer & Lawrence I. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeorers, in
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (AJ. Auerbach ed., 1988). This may
be particularly true in firms in which human capital is an important source of power. See Zingales,
Search, supra note 10, at 37 ("[Ihe major corporate governance problem [is] how to prevent
conflicts among stakeholders from paralyzing or destroying the firm.").
76. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1991).
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state." Such centralization promotes efficiency and facilitates an enterprise
that can easily adapt to changing circumstances. These insights on the
importance of centralized decision-making were formalized by Kenneth
Arrow, one of the pioneers of transaction-cost economics. 78 Directors' use of
this centralized power-and with it, their ability to control other people's
money-is subject to a variety of formal and informal constraints including
regulatory laws, contracts, market behavior, and norms.
In contrast, the role for shareholders is limited. They vote, sell, or sue,
each in carefully measured doses.7 9 Shareholders actually vote on very few
things, including an annual election of directors and certain fundamental
corporate changes after the board of directors has proposed them.
80
Coordination costs and the rational passivity of most shareholders have
meant that voting has traditionally provided weak practical limits on
centralized director power.81 Voting to replace incumbent management was
seldom successful in the time before the advent of hostile takeovers.82
Selling shares on the market has always been an option available to
shareholders, given the longstanding corporate principle of free trans-
ferability of shares.8 3 The structure of markets and the dominance of passive,
dispersed shareholders in most corporations made the collective use of this
selling power a little-used means of changing corporate control prior to the
widespread use of the cash tender offer in the 1960s and the rise in
prominence of hostile takeovers in subsequent decades. 84 The frenetic
takeover activity during the early 1980s-fueled by the use of "junk-bond"
77. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6301 (2001); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 351.310 (West 2001);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1027 (West 2000); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1721 (West 2000);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-101 (Law Co-op. 2000); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1999).
78. See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68-70 (1974).
79. See Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance:
Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 216-18
(1999) (describing shareholder rights under state corporate law).
80. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (1991); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.03, 8.08 (1999)
(both addressing the power of shareholders to vote on the election of directors); see also DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (1991); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03 (1999) (both amending the articles of
incorporation); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1991); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.03 (1999)
(both approving mergers); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (1991); MODEL BUS. CORP, ACT § 12.02
(1999) (both approving sales of assets not in the ordinary course of business); DEL. CODE ANN. tit,
8, § 275(b) (1991); MODELBUS. CORP. ACT § 14.01 (1999) (both approving dissolution).
81. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 15, at 66-67.
82. See John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable
Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 849 (1999).
83. This principle is implicit in statutory provisions authorizing the restriction on the transfer of
shares. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202 (1991); MODELBUS. CORP. ACT § 6.27 (1999).
84. The modem era of hostile takeovers might be traced to the 1974 decision by Morgan
Stanley to advise International Nickel in a hostile bid. See BRUCE WASSERSTEIN, BIG DEAL 470
(1998). Morgan Stanley selected Joe Flom as its lawyer, an event later called a "watershed" in the
history of Flom's firm, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. See LINCOLN CAPLAN,
SKADDEN: POWER, MONEY, AND THE RISE OF A LEGAL EMPIRE 57 (1993).
276 [Vol. 80:261
Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role
financing-transformed collective selling of shares into a real threat to
directors' control.85
Thus for most of the last century, it was the third area of shareholder
rights-suing-that provided the greatest check on centralized board power.
Courts necessarily played the key role in this mechanism, usually by
developing and applying after the fact the broad concepts of fiduciary duty
that limited the actions of directors. Indeed, the key regulatory move of the
1980s in corporate takeovers was the rise of fiduciary duties as the primary
means to sort out legal claims regarding the ability of directors to limit or
thwart the collective use of shareholder selling. Fiduciary duty held center
stage, overpowering possible alternatives such as direct shareholder action to
vote or sell shares, the regulatory provisions of the Williams Act,86 or the
unfettered dictates of the market.87
Given the importance of a shareholder's right to sue, some additional
discussion of how fiduciary-duty litigation proceeds in corporate law is a
necessary foundation for interpreting Unocal. A fiduciary-duty claim
involves a shareholder's request for a court to intrude into director decision-
making. In this context there are both a common starting point and
predictable paths by which a court will approach corporate claims alleging
breach of fiduciary duty. The starting point is judicial deference, as
expressed by the business-judgment rule. Courts presume that board actions
are appropriate, and unless the court is moved from that position, it will defer
to those actions and decline to intervene.88 The factors that will move a court
off its initial position have been stated in different ways in different times,
and they vary depending on the particular judicial context in which the
question arises, but they revolve around four core issues: (1) good faith; (2)
85. For a useful historical account of the development of hostile takeovers, see Carol B.
Swanson, The Turn in Takeovers: A Study in Public Appeasement and Unstoppable Capitalism, 30
GA. L. REV. 943, 958-81 (1996). John Coates recently offered the following observation, which
seems particularly relevant to our discussion: "[F]rom the late 1950s, the tender offer mechanism
has allowed bidders to package two relatively weak shareholder powers-the right to sell their
shares and the right to vote for directors-into a powerful form of shareholder 'voice.'" Coates.
supra note 82, at 850.
86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m (d)-(f), 78n (d)-(t) (1994).
87. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel L Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1194-95 (1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook
& Fischel, Proper Role] (suggesting that a board's response to a takeover threat should be passive).
88. This structure is implicit in many cases. For a particularly clear recognition of the business-
judgment rule as the starting point, see In re JXC Conununications, Inc. %. Cincinnati Bell, Inc.,
C.A. Nos. 17324, 17334, 1999 WL 1009174 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999). The court explained that:
Under Delaware law a breach of fiduciary duty analysis in the context of a merger
begins with the rebuttable presumption that a company's board of directors has acted
with care, loyalty, and in "good faith:' Unless this presumption is sufficiently
rebutted.., this Court must defer to the discretion of the board and acknowledge that
the board's decisions are entitled to the benefit of the business judgment rule.
Ld. at *4.
2001]
278 Texas Law Review [Vol. 80:261
reasonable investigation; (3) conflict of interest; and (4) the substance or
fairness of the transaction. Outside of hostile takeovers, the court's usual
approach has been to require the plaintiff to show that the defendants acted
inappropriately under at least one of those factors. In the absence of such a
showing, the court will not proceed further and the challenged transaction
will stand. Of the four, the last is the most controversial. Some believe it
should not be there at all,89 while others believe that a decision could be
challenged on this ground if it is egregious or not rational. 90 In any event,
such a challenge is very rarely successful. 91
89. Charles Hansen, The AL! Corporate Governance Project: Of the Duty of Due Care and the
Business Judgment Rule, A Comnentary, 41 BUS. LAW. 1237, 1239 (1986) ("[A]ny hint that such a
standard be applied to the substance of a decision (apart from a review for egregious conduct) must
be negated-and negated firmly-in the work of the Institute."). The Delaware cases offer some
support for this position. Chief Justice Veasey recently weighed in on the issue in Brehm v. Eisner,
746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (citations omitted):
As for the plaintiffs' contention that the directors failed to exercise "substantive due
care," we should note that such a concept is foreign to the business judgment rule.
Courts do not measure, weigh or quantify directors' judgments. We do not even decide
if they are reasonable in this context. Due care in the decisionmaking context is
process due care only. Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment rule.
Irrationality may be the functional equivalent of the waste test or it may tend to show
that the decision is not made in good faith, which is a key ingredient of the business
judgment rule.
We interpret this statement to be in harmony with our summary of the law above. When Chief
Justice Veasey refers to "due care," he is focusing on the issue that we have labeled "reasonable
investigation." When he asserts that there is no such thing as "substantive due care," he is not
saying that the court will never consider the substance of a transaction. Rather, he is distinguishing
that substantive aspect of the inquiry ("waste") from the procedural aspect of the inquiry ("due
care"). Finally, he notes correctly that courts will sometimes use substance ("irrationality") as t
proxy for determining good faith.
90. See In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("What
should be understood, but may not widely be understood by courts or commentators who are not
often required to face such questions, is that compliance with a director's duty of care can never
appropriately be judicially determined by reference to the content of the board decision that leads to
a corporate loss, apart from consideration of the good faith or rationality of the process
employed.").
91. In Gagliardi v. Tri-Foods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051-52 (Del. Ch. 1996), Chancellor
Allen wrote:
[I]n the absence of facts showing self-dealing or improper motive, a corporate officer
or director is not legally responsible to the corporation for losses that may be suffered
as a result of a decision that an officer made or that directors authorized in good faith,
There is a theoretical exception to this general statement that holds that some decisions
may be so "egregious" that liability for losses they cause may follow even in the
absence of proof of conflict of interest or improper motivation. The exception,
however, has resulted in no awards of money judgments against corporate officers or
directors in this jurisdiction .... Thus, to allege that a corporation has suffered a loss
as a result of a lawful transaction, within the corporation's powers, authorized by a
corporate fiduciary acting in a good faith pursuit of corporate purposes, does not state
a claim for relief against that fiduciary no matter how foolish the investment may
appear in retrospect.
Notable examples of contrary results exist in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692
F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982) (reversing a lower-court dismissal of a derivative action based on a
corporate decision, which put the bank in a classic "no-win" situation); Litwin v. Allen, 25
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The most common method used by plaintiffs to overcome the business-
judgment rule is to show a conflict of interest by the board of directors or
other decision-makers. In such duty-of-loyalty cases, the court will review
the substance of the transaction, usually shifting the burden of proof to the
defendant to prove the entire fairness of the transaction. 9- This analysis, of
course, takes the court deep into the fourth factor, the fairness of the
transaction, thereby drawing a stark contrast between duty-of-care cases and
duty-of-loyalty cases in the law of fiduciary duty.
Although showing a conflict of interest is the most common means of
overcoming the business-judgment rule, a deficiency as to one of the other
factors can have a similar effect. For example, when directors fail to engage
in an appropriate level of investigation, they lose the protection of the
business-judgment rule. As demonstrated by the Cinerama decision of the
Delaware Supreme Court, such a failing leads to judicial review of fairness.9 3
Finally, before departing from our discussion of foundational principles,
we note that the last two decades have seen important procedural
developments relating to derivative litigation. These developments have
been initiated by directors who would be unable to claim the full protection
of the business-judgment rule. In an attempt to regain the protective
deference of the business-judgment rule, they introduce internal corporate
mechanisms to cleanse the taint of self-interest that stains the challenged
transaction.94 These developments relate primarily to the demand require-
ment and the authority of special litigation committees. The result has been a
complicated web of rules regulating derivative litigation, but the central
policy question in most cases typically focuses on how intensive judicial
review of various director decisions will be.
95
N.Y.S.2d 667 (App. Div. 1940) (holding the directors of a trust company and wholly owned
subsidiary liable for approving a no-win investment).
92. See, e.g., Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445,469 (Del. 1991) ("The interested directors bear the
burden of proving the entire fairness of the transaction in all its aspects, including both the fairness
of the price and the fairness of the directors' dealings.").
93. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993) ("A breach of either the
duty of loyalty or the duty of care rebuts the presumption that the directors have acted in the best
interests of the shareholders, and requires the directors to prove that the transaction was entirely
fair.").
94. For an early example, see Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 91 A.2d 57,59 (Del. 1952),
which stated, "Mhe entire atmosphere is freshened and a new set of rules invoked where formal
approval has been given by a majority of independent, fully informed [sharelholders."
95. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (holding that a demand on the directors is
required prior to bringing a derivative suit unless the demand would be futile; if a majority of the
board is interested, futility is established); Scattered Corp. v. Chi. Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70
(Del. 1997) (discussing judicial review of a board decision not to bring suit after a demand was
made); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (permitting judicial review of a board
action when demand is excused and an independent committee recommends that litigation be
terminated).
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IV. The Limits of Fiduciary Duty
A. The Origins of Unocal
Defensive tactics to hostile takeovers fit uneasily within the corporate-
governance structure just described. The absence of any direct conflict of
interest in the sense usually associated with self-dealing-where directors
cause the corporation to enter into a transaction involving either the directors
or a party under their control on the other side-suggests that the stringent
demands of the fairness standard are inappropriate. Indeed, in the years
immediately before Unocal was decided, three federal appellate courts were
asked to consider the duties owed by directors who adopt defensive tactics.
Each found no conflict of interest and applied the deferential review of the
traditional business-judgment rule.96 Significantly, one of the decisions was
written by Collins Seitz, formerly Chancellor of Delaware, who was then
sitting on the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Together,
these three opinions helped set the stage for Unocal.
97
At roughly the same time, several academics applying the budding
principles of law and economics-and relying on the agency theory of the
firm-argued for an interpretation of director duty that severely constrained
the use of defensive tactics. These arguments were built largely on three
premises: (1) defensive actions are suspicious because they entrench
directors; (2) shareholders do not effectively monitor directors; and (3) the
market for corporate control "automatically" monitors directors. The most
provocative of these efforts was a proposal by now-Judge Frank Easterbrook
and Professor Daniel Fischel that directors remain passive in the face of a
hostile takeover bid.98 Although Easterbrook and Fischel were the most
strident critics of incumbent-board defensive actions, they were not alone.
99
Against this backdrop, the Unocal court created a new approach that
followed neither of the paths just described, but reacted to both of them. It
expressly rejected the passivity principle and reaffirmed the ability of
96. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293-95 (7th Cir. 1981); Johnson v.
Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980); Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382-
84 (2d Cir. 1980).
97. The Unocal court cited Judge Seitz's decision. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
98. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 15, at 204-05 (concluding that all devices that delay
or prevent an acquisition make shareholders worse off).
99. See Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1029 (1982); Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply
and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to
Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981)
[hereinafter Gilson, Structural Approach]. In reference to these articles, Ronald Gilson noted that
there was consensus surrounding one important point-namely, that "there is no coherent
justification for allowing target management to engage in defensive tactics that may deprive
shareholders of the opportunity to tender their shares." Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids
Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51, 52 (1982).
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directors to take defensive action.1°° The court recognized that directors fill
an important role by acting as representatives of the shareholders, even if the
directors are not completely free of conflicts. At the same time, the presence
of inherent conflicts of interest made the court unwilling to jump imme-
diately to the level of deference accorded by the business-judgment rule.
Thus was born an intermediate standard of review-a level of scrutiny more
intrusive than the business-judgment rule but less searching than fairness
review. The animating force underlying this new standard was the
"omnipresent specter" of conflict in a takeover defense, even though the
conflict falls short of the express conflict in a self-dealing transaction.!1
The Unocal standard employs the same four factors described above
that judges use to evaluate director action in other contexts, but Unocal
assembled those factors in a new and curious way that has attracted some
subsequent judicial criticism.102  The Unocal court presented its new
approach as a "threshold" that lay before the business-judgment rule. As
discussed above, a traditional fiduciary-duty claim requires the plaintiff to
show an absence of good faith, a lack of reasonable investigation, the
presence of a conflict of interest, or a lack of substantive rationality. By
contrast, under Unocal, once the plaintiff is able to show that the context of
the claim requires application of the Unocal standard, the court shifts the
burden of proof to the defendant to show both (1) that the directors
reasonably perceived a threat to the corporation, and (2) that the directors'
defensive responses were proportional to that threat. 10 3
100. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 n.10 ("It has been suggested that a board's response to a takeover
threat should be a passive one. However, that is clearly not the law of Delaware ... .") (citation
omitted).
101. Id. at 954 ("Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its
own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty
which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the business judgment
rule may be conferred."). Unocal does mention the ability of the shareholders to vote out the
directors, but it does not develop the point. Id at 959.
102. See, e.g., it re Gaylord Container Corp. S'holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462,474-77 (Del. Ch.
2000).
103. If the defendant carries this burden, the burden theoretically shifts to the plaintiff, and the
business-judgment rule engages. However, as noted by Vice Chancellor Strine in Gaylord:
It is not at all apparent how a plaintiff could meet this burden in a circumstance where
the board met its burden under Unocal. To the extent that the plaintiff has persuasi e
evidence of disloyalty (for example, that the board acted in a self-interested or bad-
faith fashion), this would fatally undercut the board's Unocal showing. Similarly, it is
hard to see how a plaintiff could rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule
by demonstrating that the board acted in a grossly careless manner in a circumstance
where the board had demonstrated that it had acted reasonably and proportionately.
Least of all could a plaintiff show that the board's actions lacked a rational business
purpose in a context where the board had already demonstrated that those actions were
reasonable, i.e., rational.
Gaylord, 753 A.2d at 475-76.
In the converse situation, where the board fails to carry its initial burdens, the board is still
allowed to proceed with an attempt to show the entire fairness of the transaction. Unitrin, 651 A.2d
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The effect of the Unocal threshold would appear to provide the plaintiff
with three additional opportunities for avoiding business-judgment review:
the procedural hurdle of requiring the defendant to carry the burden of proof
and the two prongs of the Unocal standard. But there is less to Unocal than
meets the eye. Shifting the burden of proof, for example, might seem to be a
promising means of increasing the likelihood of director liability. In this
regard, the Unocal court took its cue from Cheff v. Mathes,'14 a "greenmail"
case from the early 1960s. As noted by Ronald Gilson, however, this type of
burden shifting in the wake of Cheff had no perceptible effect on the outcome
of cases that would distinguish them from cases subject to the traditional
business-judgment rule. 05 Likewise, it seems unlikely that the mere shifting
of burdens would have a significant impact on the outcome of Unocal
litigation.
The first prong of the Unocal standard is similarly uninspiring to a
hopeful plaintiff. While the defendants are nominally required to show that
"they had reasonable grounds for believing there was a danger to corporate
policy and effectiveness," the Unocal court (again following Chefj) stated
that this burden of proof was "satisfied by a showing of good faith and
reasonable investigation."'' 0 6 In other words, the parties would be debating
the same issues that would arise under the business-judgment rule.
The second prong of the Unocal standard-the proportionality part of
the review-was the most controversial aspect of the case and the most
promising basis for extricating the court from the business-judgment rule.
The cause of the excitement (for those on both sides of the issue) was that the
at 1377 n.18. This, too, seems fairly implausible. See Gaylord, 753 A.2d at 476. All of this
awkwardness surrounding Unocal has prompted Vice Chancellor Strine to call for a reformulation
of the Unocal standard:
[O]ne wonders whether it might also be clearer to reformulate the Unocal test so that it
incorporates the concept of due deference to board judgment articulated in Unocal and
Unitrin without the confusing burden-shifting required to tie everything to the business
judgment and entire fairness standards of review.... That is, if Unocal is the standard
of review in a case, perhaps it ought to be the exclusive standard of review.
One tentative approach to such a formulation might be to simply place the burden
on the plaintiffs to prove that the directors' defensive actions were a disproportionate
and unreasonable or an improperly motivated response to the threats faced by the
corporation, based on all of the circumstances (which would include the interests of
and care used by the directors who made the decision).... Such a test could
incorporate the requirement that directors' actions be sustained if they are not
draconian and are within the range of reasonable defensive responses. This test would
give plaintiffs the opportunity to attack the board's decision directly (a chance
plaintiffs do not get in the normal case) and yet preserve for boards a realm of
reasonable discretion protected from judicial intrusion.
Gaylord, 753 A.2d at 476 n.46.
104. 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964). Greenmail is "the act of buying enough stock in a company to
threaten a hostile takeover and then selling the stock back to the corporation at an inflated price."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 709 (7th ed. 1999).
105. Gilson, Structural Approach, supra note 99, at 828-29.
106. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986).
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second prong seemed to require a substantive judgment by the court,
something completely missing from most cases decided under the business-
judgment rule.
Requiring the court to perform a substantive review as a threshold test is
a bit jarring. In simplest terms, the court said that defendants who wish to
reach the promised land of no substantive review (under the business-
judgment rule) must first cross a threshold that required substantive
review!10 7 Of course, whether this is as dramatic as it sounds depends on
how substantive the review under Unocal is, a topic we address in the next
section.
The decision in Unocal was accompanied by much fanfare and
speculation about the willingness of Delaware courts to insert themselves
into hotly contested battles for corporate control.1Ys In an early effort to
apply the Unocal framework, Chancellor William Allen called Unocal "the
most innovative and promising case in our recent corporation law."'1 9
Regardless of one's predilections about the initial decision, however, the
subsequent development of the Unocal standard has failed to live up to its
early billing. In the following sections, we describe our survey of all
Delaware cases applying the Unocal framework to demonstrate that Unocal
almost never results in judicial invalidation of takeover defenses. We also
find a dramatic decrease in the number of Unocal claims decided in the
Delaware courts. We then look at the reasoning of Unocal's progeny in an
effort to explain our results and conclude that Unocal, as currently structured,
does not provoke judicial scrutiny of director defensive tactics that is at all
"enhanced," as compared to the review provided under the traditional
business-judgment standard. Finally, in the normative aspect of our Unocal
107. In his recent analysis of the relationship between Unocal and the business-judgment rule,
Vice Chancellor Strine observed:
In itself, the Unocal test is a straightforward analysis of whether what a board did was
reasonable. But Unocal's purpose and application have been cloaked in a larger, rather
ill-fitting doctrinal garment. Once the court applies the Unocal test, its job is, as a
technical matter, not over. If, upon applying Unocal, the court finds that the
defendants have met their burden of demonstrating the substantive reasonableness of
their actions, the court must then go on to apply the normal review appropriate in cases
that do not implicate Unocal. In essence, the court must reimpose on the plaintiffs the
burden of showing "by a preponderance of the evidence" that the business judgment
rule is inapplicable. Of course, the business judgment rule exists in large measure to
prevent the business decisions of a board of directors from being judicially examined
for their substantive reasonableness-an eventuality that has, in the Unocal context,
already taken place.
Gaylord, 753 A.2d at 474-75 (citations omitted).
108. The case was discussed in major news and financial publications. See, e.g., Stephen
Koepp, A Shark Loses Some of His Teeth, TIME, June 3, 1985, at 58; James R. Norman, At Unocal,
A Victory "Witlout the Champagne, " BUS. WEEK, June 3. 1985, at 41; Frederick Rose et al., Battle
of Tans: How T. Boone Pickens Finally Met His Match: Unocal's Fred Hartley, WALL Sr. J., May
24, 1985, 1985 WL-WSJ 252634.
109. City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787,796 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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analysis, we explain why this standard-or any other standard based on
fiduciary duty-is incapable of policing management entrenchment.
B. Empirical Results of Unocal Cases, 1985-2000
Between the issuance of Unocal in 1985 and the end of 2000, a Westlaw
search shows that the Delaware Court of Chancery issued 141 opinions citing
Unocal and that the Delaware Supreme Court issued 33 opinions citing
Unocal. Of course, many of these citations were merely incidental refer-
ences to the case. Only 34 Court of Chancery opinions and 8 Supreme Court
opinions work through the entire Unocal analysis and reach a conclusion in
the case. t t0 Very few cases are decided exclusively on the first prong of
Unocal. In almost every case raising this issue, the courts find a cognizable
threat.1t '
The most dramatic evidence of Unocal's feebleness is revealed in the
outcomes of proportionality review, the second prong of Unocal analysis.
Since Unocal was decided in 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court has not
found defensive tactics to be disproportionate outside of a Revlon context. 12
The Court of Chancery has been more aggressive in finding
disproportionality, t t3 but in every such case that has reached the Delaware
Supreme Court, the finding of disproportionality has been reversed or pushed
to the side." 4
110. In several important decisions sometimes associated with Unocal-including Quickturn
Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998); Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368
(Del. 1996); Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995); and Mills
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988)-the Delaware Supreme Court
reached a conclusion based on the Unocal standard.
111. The structure of enhanced scrutiny suggests that if a threat were not found, a board would
not have carried its burden. In contrast, the absence of a threat has sometimes been used to explain
why director action does not trigger any scrutiny beyond the deference of the business-judgment
rule, a use that seems inconsistent with the reasoning set forth in Unocal. See, e.g., Kahn ex rel.
DeKalb Genetics Corp. v. Roberts, 679 A.2d 460, 466 (Del. 1996), which held that Unocal should
not apply when the corporation repurchased its shares in the absence of a hostile bidder.
112. See, e.g., Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993)
(striking down various board-instituted defensive tactics where the board's primary duty had
become that of being an auctioneer).
113. The Court of Chancery has found defensive measures disproportionate in nine eases.
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000); Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn
Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d 25 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff'd sub nom. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v.
Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998); In re Unitrin, Inc. S'holders Litig., Nos. Civ, A. 13656, 13699,
1994 WL 698483 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1994); Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049
(Del. Ch. 1988); Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988); City Capital
Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988); Tate & Lyle PLC v. Staley
Cont'l, Inc., 1988 WL 46064 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988); Phillips v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., 1987
WL 16285 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 1987); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d
103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
114. The most recent Court of Chancery opinion striking down defensive actions is Chesapeake
Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000). The appeal of that case was dropped after a
subsequent business transaction. See Shorewood Agrees to International Paper Acquisition, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 17, 2000, 2000 WL-WSJ 3018437. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of
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What effect has the inhospitable reception given to Unocal claims by
the Delaware Supreme Court had on the takeover market? Causal
connections of this type are impossible to forge with confidence, but we
venture a few speculative remarks. First, we suspect that the weakened
Unocal standard probably accounts-at least in part-for the limited
litigation in this area.'15 Despite several recent decisions by Vice Chancellor
Strine,1 6 litigation in the Delaware courts over issues relating to hostile
takeovers has slowed considerably. From 1985 through 1990, the Delaware
courts decided an average of 3.5 cases per year in which they employed the
Unocal analysis.117 From 1991 through 2000, the Delaware courts decided
just over one such case per year.'18
Chancery's condemnation of the "no-hand" poison pill in Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v.
Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998), but did so on non-Unocal grounds. The Delaware Supreme
Court reversed the Court of Chancery in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361
(Del. 1995). The Court of Chancery's opinions in Pillsbury, Interco, and AC Acquisitions were
never appealed, but the Delaware Supreme Court went out of its way to discredit their reasoning in
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152-53 (Del. 1989) ("To the extent
that the Court of Chancery has recently [substituted its judgment regarding what would be a more
attractive deal for that of a corporation's board of directors] in certain of its opinions, we hereby
reject such approach as not in keeping with a proper Unocal analysis:'). The Court of Chancery's
opinion in Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998), was not appealed, but the
Delaware Supreme Court cited it with seeming approval in Quickiurn, 721 A.2d at 1291. The
interlocutory appeal in Evans was dismissed for mootness after the target company's board decided
to sell the company. Macmillan, Inc. v. Robert M. Bass Group, Inc., 548 A.2d 498 (Del. 1988).
The Court of Chancery decisions in Staley Continental and Insitiforz were not appealed, and there
have been no references to the cases by the Delaware Supreme Court.
115. Perhaps it should go without saying, but there are other possible explanations for the
decrease in litigation. For example, the extensive litigation in the late 1980s may have provided all
of the guidance that most companies needed to erect takeover defenses capable of passing judicial
review. More specifically, by allowing the adoption of poison pills, the Delaware courts have
enabled incumbent boards with staggered terms to effectively preclude hostile takeovers, thus
obviating the need for more innovative defenses.
116. See In re Gaylord Container Corp. S'holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462 (Del. Ch. 2000);
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000); Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic, 769 A.2d 88
(Del. Ch. 2000).
117. We only considered opinions where the court worked through the Unocal standard,
eliminating cases that cited Unocal only peripherally and cases-such as Davis Acquisition, Inc. r.
NWA, Inc., No. Civ.A.10761, 1989 WL 40845 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 1989)-where the facts implicated
a Unocal analysis but the court postponed an ultimate decision under Unocal for procedural
considerations. Where a single set of facts generated opinions by the Court of Chancery and the
Delaware Supreme Court, we counted only one case. For example, in 1985 and 1986, the Delaware
courts issued two opinions in the well-known Revlon litigation. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); MacAndrewvs & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon,
Inc., 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch. 1985). In such instances, we counted only one unique case. Under
these terms, we found 21 unique cases from 1985 to 1990. If we had counted opinions instead of
cases, we would have found an average of 4.83 opinions per year as follows: 1985-five opinions;
1986-two opinions; 1987-three opinions; 1988-seven opinions; 1989-six opinions; 1990-six
opinions.
118. We found only 12 unique Unocal cases from 1991 through 2000. with only one case in
which a single set of facts generated Unocal opinions by both the Court of Chancery and the
Delaware Supreme Court. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34
(Del. 1993); QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications Inc., 635 A.2d 1245 (Del. Ch.
1993). This may seem surprising, but several notable cases illustrate why many cases did not
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The decline in Unocal litigation might be thought to be related to a
decline in hostile-takeover activity. This explanation might explain litigation
patterns in the early 1990s. But from 1994 through 1998 there were an
average of 40 hostile bids per year." 9 Moreover, there were 68 hostile bids
in 1995, "nearly as many as any year in the 1980s.,, 120 The bottom line is
that during the 1990s the number of hostile transactions returned to levels
nearly equal to those of the 1980s, and the number of Delaware corporations
remains as high as ever, but neither participants in those takeover battles nor
target-company shareholders seem to be going to court.121 In the absence of
a change in the legal standards, this result would seem particularly puzzling
because success rates for hostile bidders have declined over time,
122
suggesting that the need for litigation is stronger than ever. In the next
section, we explore a common-sense explanation to that puzzle.
C. The Death of Unocal
What explains the death of Unocal in the Delaware Supreme Court? In
this section, we explore that question by analyzing the evolution of takeover
defenses and their treatment in the Delaware courts. We describe how
Unocal became a dead letter and propose that the dearth of current litigation
over the Unocal standard stems from the simple fact that outcomes in hostile
produce dual opinions. Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, Ine., 728 A.2d 25, 52
(Del. Ch. 1998) decided the fate of a "no-hand" poison pill under Unocal, but the Delaware
Supreme Court decided the appeal under "fundamental Delaware law." Quickturn Design Sys., Inc.
v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1290 (Del. 1998). In Williams v. Geier, the Court of Chancery
examined a recapitalization plan under Unocal, but the Delaware Supreme Court subsequently held
that Unocal does not apply in the absence of unilateral board action. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d
1368, 1377 (Del. 1996). The Court of Chancery held that a stock repurchase plan violated Unocal
in In re Unitrin, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 1994 WL 698483, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1994), but
the Delaware Supreme Court clarified the Unocal standard and reversed and remanded for further
proceedings. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1389-91 (Del. 1995).
During the time period in question, three years (1992, 1996, and 1999) show no Unocal cases.
The busiest years were 1994 and 2000, each with three Unocal cases-less than an average year in
the late 1980s.
119. Coates, supra note 82, at 855.
120. Id.
121. Unocal claims are often brought by the hostile bidder during the contest for control.
Delaware courts are extremely accommodating of litigants' need for expedited process, and the lag
between the underlying board action and written court opinions is often short, usually a few months.
In other circumstances, claims are brought by derivative plaintiffs, and the lag between the
underlying board action and written court opinions is often measured in years. In some situations,
the target board may initially oppose a takeover but agree to a plan before a judicial hearing is held
or a decision rendered. See, e.g., Robert Langreth, Behind Pfizer's Takeover Battle: An Urgent
Need, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2000, 2000 WL-WSJ 3017104 (reporting Pfizer's success in acquiring
Warner-Lambert over American Home Products's opposition). If there has been an increase in that
activity, that would not be picked up in the data we have.
122. See Coates, supra note 82, at 856 (noting that "total bidder 'win' rates have... fallen only
modestly, from 32% in the peak hostile bid year of 1988, to 24% in 1998"). We are not sure
whether we agree that a 25% decline in the success rate is "modest," but nothing in our argument
turns on the resolution of that point.
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takeover litigation have become so predictable that the combatants choose to
avoid the effort. Although Delaware fiduciary-duty law is notoriously
indeterminate,123 Unocal has become well-settled in the sense that directors
win except in extreme cases.1
24
The story behind Unocal begins with an understanding of the rationale
for tolerating defensive actions that is consistent with the theory and statutory
structure arguments discussed in the previous sections. Why not simply
prohibit directors of target corporations from acting defensively or permit
directors to make all takeover decisions? In their well-known endorsement
of director passivity, Easterbrook and Fischel argued that takeovers should be
encouraged and concluded that courts should structure director fiduciary
duties accordingly. 125 The problem with this form of argument is twofold:
(1) the issue of whether takeovers create social wealth has never been fully
resolved,126 and (2) whether a board in a particular situation should act
123. See D. Gordon Smith, A Proposal to Eliminate Director Standards from the Model
Business Corporation Act, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1201, 1206-09 (1999) (using Delaware as an
example in discussing the importance of ambiguity and vagueness in the transmission of decision
rules); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1909 (1998) (arguing that vagueness and indeterminacy in Delaware law
accentuates Delaware's judicial advantage).
124. Consider the three most recent cases in which plaintiffs prevailed in a Unocal claim. In
Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180, 1195 (Del. Ch. 1998), the board adopted a "dead-hand"
poison pill as a planning device, and Vice Chancellor Jacobs found the device could be both
coercive and preclusive under Unitrin. Jacobs's conclusion rests on the finding that the continuing-
director provision is a "show stopper" in the sense that "if only the incumbent directors or their
designated successors could redeem the pill, it would make little sense for shareholders or the
hostile bidder to wage a proxy contest to replace the incumbent board." Id. at 1187.
Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickrurn Design Systems, Inc., 728 A.2d 25 (Del. Ch. 1998),
involved a poison pill with a "delayed redemption provision" that prevented any directors from
redeeming Quickturn's poison pill for six months following the election of a new board. Vice
Chancellor Jacobs held that the delayed redemption provision was neither coercive nor preclusive
under Unitrin, but that it was outside the range of reasonableness because "the board has failed to
show why the additional six month delay imposed by the DRP is necessary to achieve the board's
stated purpose for its adoption." Id. at 49, 52.
In Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 296-97 (Del. Ch. 2000), the directors of
Shorewood Packaging Corporation amended the bylaws to increase the vote required for
amendment from a majority to two-thirds. The action was designed to protect the corporation's
staggered board, which was created by the bylaws. Because the managers owned nearly 24% of the
company's outstanding shares, the bylaw amendment "made it mathematically impossible for
Chesapeake to prevail in a Consent Solicitation without management's support, assuming a 90%
turnout." Id. at 297.
These cases each involve actions that appear designed to test the edges of acceptable board
behavior. The actions at issue in Carnody and Chesapeake were viewed by the judges as
completely disabling to shareholder choice. In Quickturn, the action was not extreme enough to be
considered coercive or preclusive by Vice Chancellor Jacobs, but the Delaware Supreme Court
subsequently held that it violated "fundamental Delaware law" by preventing a future board from
redeeming the pill. See Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1290 (Del. 1998).
125. Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 87, at 1164.
126. For an excellent introduction to the debate, see Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers:
Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119 (1992). For a recent study suggesting
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defensively and whether there should be a blanket prohibition against
defensive action are separate issues. Obviously, internal-governance rules
may dramatically affect the role of hostile takeovers in a macroeconomic
sense. Nevertheless, in light of the ambiguity surrounding the desirability of
hostile takeovers, courts have implicitly concluded that internal-governance
rules should not be crafted in a way that is designed to encourage such
transactions, but rather should be crafted to maximize value to the target
corporation's shareholders in the event that a hostile transaction is proposed.
Because the Delaware courts have soundly rejected the view that
defensive actions by boards of directors should be prohibited, 127 the battle
now rages around a different issue: given that defensive actions are
sometimes appropriate, when do boards cross the line between serving the
shareholders' interests and serving their own interests? According to
Unocal, that line was to be drawn based on the existence of the threat to a
corporate purpose (first prong), and the magnitude and proportionality of the
directors' response to that threat (second prong).
In cases after Unocal, courts have interpreted threats so broadly that
almost any threat-no matter how trivial-suffices under the first prong of
the analysis. The facts in Unocal present what appeared to be a severe threat,
as conveyed by the multiple adjectives that Justice Moore used to describe
the tactic: a two-tiered, front-end loaded, coercive takeover.12 8 In a typology
first suggested by Professors Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, and later
used by judges, this would be labeled "structural coercion," 129 but for a
variety of reasons such bids are largely a historical relic. 130 The last time a
court applying Unocal found an actual bid that was structurally coercive was
in 1990.131
that acquiring firms systematically overpay, see MARK L. SIROWER, How COMPANIES LOSE THE
ACQUISITION GAME (1997).
127. In reference to Easterbrook and Fisehel's proposal, the Unocal court observed, "that
clearly is not the law of Delaware, and as the proponents of this rule of passivity readily concede, it
has not been adopted either by courts or state legislatures." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 957 n.10 (Del. 1985).
128. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 957 (1985); see also Andrew G.T. Moore II, The 1980s, Did We Save
the Stockholders While the Corporation Burned?, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 277,284 (1992) (asserting that
"the Court's decision in Unocal... signaled the end of the coercive two-tier junk bond fueled
tender offer").
129. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive
Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247, 260-65 (1989). It was
a combination of Unocal's tough treatment of such bids and SEC regulations that virtually
eliminated structurally coercive bids from the takeover field. See Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d
1131, 1145 (Del. 1990); Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 1990 WL 42607 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 1990).
130. The defensive action taken by Unocal's board of directors is also a historical relic. In the
wake of Unocal, the SEC adopted Rule 14d-10 to prohibit selected tender offers. 17 C.F.R. §
240.14d 10(a) (1987). The Rule has withstood a challenge on grounds that it exceeded the SEC's
authority. See Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 995 (3rd Cir. 1988).
131. Gilbert, 575 A.2d 1131; Tomczak, 1990 WL 42607. In a recent decision, the court
allowed the board of directors to consider the possibility of a structurally coercive bid despite the
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The language in Unocal permits threats broader than those apparent
from the facts in that case, 32 and subsequent courts have embraced contexts
that would come within the other two legs of the Gilson and Kraakman
typology: opportunity loss and substantive coercion.133 In opportunity loss
situations, managers seek to intervene to protect the shareholders against the
loss of an opportunity; for example, to give shareholders more time to
become fully informed 34 or to allow management to construct an alternative
transaction. 35 As interpreted by the Delaware courts, substantive coercion is
potentially the broadest form of threat.136  In its most mundane form,
substantive coercion results merely from a bid that is perceived by the board
to be inadequate. Such bids are said to be "coercive" to the extent that target
shareholders, if left to their own devices, might accept an inadequate offer.
137
It is not immediately obvious how shareholders are "threatened" by
inadequate offers. 38  Nevertheless, it is relatively easy to imagine how a
absence of "record evidence to support a finding that any such offer was imminent." In re Gaylord
Container Corp. S'holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 478 (Del. Ch. 2000). Cf. Paramount
Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34,48 n.18 (Del. 1993) (noting that the two
competing tender offers in that case were "two-tiered, front-end loaded, and coercive" and "should
be expected to receive particularly careful analysis by a target board").
132. The court listed the following as examples of the types of threats the board could consider:.
"inadequacy of the price offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact
on 'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps evn
the community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of securities being offered
in the exchange." Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
133. The Delaware Supreme Court expressly adopted Gilson and Kraakman's typology in
Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1384 (Del. 1995).
134. Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1123 (Del. CI. 1990) (holding that the
decision to delay an annual shareholders' meeting was a reasonable response to a perceived threat to
the shareholders' interests).
135. See, e.g., AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 112 (Del. Ch.
1986) (holding that commencing a self-tender offer in response to a tender offer creates an
alternative for shareholders and serves a "valid corporate purpose").
136. Ronald Gilson recently noted that "[ulnfortunately, only the phrase and not the substance
captured the attention of the Delaware Supreme Court; the mere incantation of substantive coercion
now seems sufficient to establish a threat under Unocal without any inquiry into the facts or
management's explanation for the market's under pricing of the company's shares:' GILSO.N, supra
note 6, at 9 n.22.
137. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995); Mentor Graphics v.
Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d 25 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff'd sub nom. Quicktum Design Sys.,
Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998); Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049
(Del. Ch. 1988); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
138. Gilson and Kraakman noted that substantive coercion requires more than inadequate price:
The only threat posed by a non-coercive offer that management considers unfair,
ill-timed, or underpriced, is the threat that something will lead shareholders to accept it.
But since such a threat is not structurally coercive, it will warrant a defensive response
only if the offer is substantively coercive in that shareholders might somehow be led to
accept unfavorable substantive terms voluntarily. Put another way, substantive
coercion posits a likely mistake by target shareholders who would not accept the terms
of an acquirer's offer if they knew what management knew about their own company,
about the acquisitions market, or about management itself. In addition, since target
management can be expected to tell shareholders, loudly and often, what it knows,
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board of directors with the authority to reject an inadequate offer might use
that authority to improve the position of shareholders.
Early Court of Chancery opinions that used Unocal to strike down
defensive tactics propounded a remarkably broad conception of so-called
substantive coercion.1 39 In his recent exegesis of substantive coercion, Vice
Chancellor Leo Strine followed the spirit of these early opinions:
As a starting point, it is important to recognize that substantive
coercion can be invoked by a corporate board in almost every
situation. There is virtually no CEO in America who does not believe
that the market is not valuing her company properly. Moreover, one
hopes that directors and officers can always say that they know more
about the company than the company's stockholders-after all, they
are paid to know more. Thus, the threat that stockholders will be
confused or wrongly eschew management's advice is omnipresent.
140
Each of these cases striking down defensive tactics admitted the
existence of a threat, even if minimal. The outcomes of the cases ultimately
hinged on the defensive tactic failing the proportionality prong of the Unocal
analysis.141 Importantly for our purposes, the outcomes of the early cases
substantive coercion must also generally posit that shareholders do not believe what
management says about the real value of the company.
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 129, at 259-60.
139. In AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del, Ch. 1986),
which involved a self-tender defensive response to a tender offer, Chancellor Allen finessed the first
prong of Unocal, reasoning that
[t]here is no evidence that the.., offer-which is non-coercive and at a concededly
fair price-threatens injury to shareholders or to the enterprise. However, I take this
aspect of the test to be simply a particularization of the more general requirement that a
corporate purpose, not one personal to the directors, must be served by the stock
repurchase....
The [target company board's] creation of... an alternative [of creating an option
for stockholders], with no other justification, serves a valid corporate purpose
(certainly so where, as here, that option is made available to all shareholders on the
same terms). That valid corporate purpose satisfies the first leg of the Unocal test.
Id. at 112. Later, in City Capital Associates, he reasoned that, even where an offer is not
structurally coercive, "it may represent a 'threat' to shareholder interests in the special sense that an
active negotiator with power, in effect, to refuse the proposal may be able to extract a higher or
otherwise more valuable proposal, or may be able to arrange an alternative transaction or a modified
business plan that will present a more valuable option to shareholders." City Capital Assocs., 551
A.2d at 797-98.
140. Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 327 (Del. Ch. 2000).
141. AC Acquisitions Corp., 519 A.2d at 112-14 (contending that it is unreasonable for a
company to take steps to preclude its shareholders from selling shares of stock to a competitor);
City Capital Assocs., 551 A.2d at 799-800 (holding that it is unreasonable for a board of directors to
prohibit its shareholders from accepting a noncoercive offer for their stock by using "poison pill"
rights). Retired Justice Duffy, sitting by designation, followed Chancellor Allen's reasoning in
Grand Metropolitan Public Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988). In that case,
Justice Duffy repeatedly emphasized that the threat posed by the hostile tender offer did not threaten
the target corporation, but only the shareholders of that corporation, and even then, the only threat
was inadequate price. Id. at 1056-59. According to Justice Duffy, the directors of the target
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were later criticized by the Delaware Supreme Court in the well-known Time
decision. 42 As a result, the Delaware Supreme Court sanctioned the use of
defensive mechanisms in the face of an offer at a price perceived to be
inadequate. By approving substantive coercion as a rationale for defensive
action, the court ensured that directors would always carry their burden of
proof on the first prong of the Unocal framework.1
43
The more innovative aspect of Unocal was its requirement that a
defensive measure "must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.'144
This "proportionality" requirement requires an examination of the
substantive effects of the board's actions,145 but it was intended to be
something less than "fairness" review.'4 In perhaps the strongest argument
made in favor of the potential of proportionality review, Ronald Gilson and
Reinier Kraakman asked a simple question: "Is proportionality review
likely to have substance?"' 47 In their view from an early vantage point,
proportionality review might evolve into nothing more than a "threshold test"
that "serves chiefly to signal judicial concern and to invite planners to
proceed with their defenses only after constructing a record that demonstrates
reasonableness and that articulates a 'threat."' 48  Alternatively, they
envisioned proportionality review as a "regulatory test" under which
"management would be forced to justify its choice of defensive actions by
corporation passed the examination of the first prong of Unocal, but stumbled on the second. Id. at
1056-60.
142. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140. 1153 (Del. 1989) (holding
that the Delaware Court of Chancery's prior opinions improperly allowed the court to substitute its
business judgment for that of a corporation's board).
143. To be fair, Unocal's first prong seemed unlikely from the start to have any real effect in
deciding cases. In establishing the first prong, the Unocal court explicitly relied on Cheff %,. Mathes,
a "greemnair' case decided in 1964, to shift the burden of proof to the defendants on issues of good
faith and reasonable investigation. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (Del. 1964). See
Gilson, Structural Approach, supra note 99, at 827-30 (discussing the burden of proof issue).
144. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
145. Marcel Kahan has argued that Unocal focuses on process alone: "Unocal subjects a
decision to reject an offer to an enhanced review of the process by which this decision is arriv-ed at,
but not to an independent review of the substantive merits of the decision." Marcel Kahan.
Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court's Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L
583, 588 (1994). We disagree. The Unocal court said that determining proportionality "entails an
analysis by the directors of the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise."
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. The court's review of that analysis is also substantive. In Unocal, the
court validated the board's decision to adopt a selective exchange offer (excluding Mesa) for thepurpose of "defeat[ing] the inadequate Mesa offer or, should the offer still succeed, [to] provide the
49% of its stockholders, who would otherwise be forced to accept 'junk bonds', with S72 worth of
senior debt." Ld. at 956. By holding that the Unocal board's actions were reasonable, the court
necessarily affirmed the board's determination that the threat existed, made a judgment about the
magnitude of the threat, and concluded that the response to the threat was "fair" to shareholders. Id.
at 955-56. This is quintessential substantive review.
146. The court firmly rebutted Mesa's arguments that the actions of Unocars board were taken
by interested directors, thus meriting fairness review. Id. at 957-58.
147. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 129, at 251.
148. Id. at 252.
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reference to the amount of coercion associated with a particular bid."
1 49
Although it seems unlikely that the Unocal court began with the minimalist
"threshold" construction in mind, the subsequent development of the Unocal
standard has shown the standard to be just that.
One reason is that courts simply are not very good at proportionality
review. Gilson and Kraakman note that effective proportionality review
requires a court to "exercise its independent judgment in weighing whether
management's plans present a plausible story: a goal that improves on the
value of the hostile offer and a means that is reasonably likely to achieve the
goal." 50 Even Gilson and Kraakman recognize that courts would not be very
effective at this type of inquiry.' 5 1 Nevertheless, they argue that
proportionality review serves a valuable "screening" function quite apart
from the outcome of the cases.'
52
The perverse effects of Unocal-with no meaningful first prong and a
second prong requiring substantive review by reluctant judges-became
apparent in Unitrin v. American General Corp.,153 where the Delaware
Supreme Court refined the Unocal proportionality standard. The Delaware
Supreme Court reversed a Court of Chancery decision that had held a
repurchase program was not reasonably related to the threat. 154 In doing so,
the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized its view that a proxy contest was
still a viable option to oust incumbent management in the wake of the
repurchase program, and suggested that the standard for proportionality was
whether the defensive measures were (1) coercive or preclusive or (2) outside
the range of reasonableness.1
55
The court said that a defensive measure would be considered "coercive"
if it were "aimed at 'cramming down' on its shareholders a management-
sponsored alternative"; a defensive measure would be considered
"preclusive" if it prevented a bidder from making an offer.'56 In short,
defensive measures that are coercive or preclusive represent only the most
149. Id. at 254.
150. Id. at 270-71.
151. Gilson and Kraakman explain that
[t]o this point, our development of an effective proportionality test remains subject to
the same criticism that we leveled at the Cheff test. Particularly in the common case
where management alleges substantive coercion because of price inadequacy, we
would be hard pressed to demonstrate a necessary benefit from the proportionality test
as we have developed it thus far. A deceptively clever story about future values might
seem to be as capable of validating preclusive defensive tactics under the
proportionality test as a clever story about policy conflicts was able to do under the old
Cheff test.
Id. at 271.
152. Id. at 273.
153. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
154. In re Unitrin, Inc. S'holders Litig., 1994 WL 698483 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1994).
155. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1386-88.
156. Id. at 1387.
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extreme assertions of director power, cutting off shareholders completely
from the opportunity to choose their own course. Anything short of that
would be evaluated by the "range of reasonableness" standard, which the
court described in terms that echo descriptions of the business-judgment rule:
The ratio decidendi for the 'range of reasonableness' standard is a
need of the board of directors for latitude in discharging its fiduciary
duties to the corporation and its shareholders when defending against
perceived threats. The concomitant requirement is for judicial
restraint. Consequently, if the board of directors' defensive response
is not draconian (preclusive or coercive) and is within a 'range of
reasonableness,' a court must not substitute its judgment for the
board's.
157
Collectively, the reformulated standards in Unitrin seem to have lost the
skepticism of incumbent managers that animated Unocal, opting instead to
consolidate power over takeover decisions in those incumbent managers
despite the "omnipresent specter" of self-interest.158  In light of our prior
observations regarding the Utocal standard, however, the extreme position
taken by the Unitrin court seems almost inevitable. 59 Given the expansive
notion of "threats" adopted by the Delaware courts, managers can hardly fail
(and rarely do) in the first prong of Unocal.6' Additionally, when the courts
come around to the second prong, they are forced into the uncomfortable
position of speculating about the relative harm posed by the threat as
compared to the benefits promised by the defensive action. In lieu of bald
speculation, and in harmony with a tradition of deference to directors, courts
are driven to seek markers that signal abuse. Short of completely foreclosing
157. I. at 1388 (citing Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34,
45-46 (Del. 1993)).
158. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
159. In Chesapeake, Vice Chancellor Strine reads Unitrin narrowly.
I read Unitrin as mandating that this court give some reasonable deference to the
considered business judgment of a board in addressing (the issue of preclusiveness]
and that this court should not quibble around the margins if a board determined that a
measure was reasonable after informed and good faith deliberations.
But I do not read Unitrin as a reformulation of Unocals focus on the actual
substantive reasonableness of defensive measures and whether a board in fact made a
good faith and informed business judgment in adopting those measures.
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 333-34 (Del. Ch. 2000).
160. Even where courts are skeptical of the existence of a threat, they will usually give the
defendants the benefit of the doubt. See, e.g., Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d
278, 289 (Del. Ch. 1989) ("While I am skeptical about the general proposition that a non-cocreive
inadequate tender offer constitutes a cognizable threat, the unusual circumstances of this ease
appear to justify some level of defendant response."). Interestingly, courts outside Delaware that
adopt the Unocal standards seem more inclined to take the first prong seriously. See, e.g., Hilton
Hotels Corp. v. IfT Corp., 978 F. Supp. 1342, 1347-48 (D. Nev. 1997); AHI Metnall, LP. by AHI
Kan., Inc. v. J.C. Nichols Co., 891 F. Supp. 1352, 1356-57 (W.D. Mo. 1995); Air Line Pilots Ass'n,
Int'l v. UAL Corp., 717 F. Supp. 575, 586-87 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (all holding that the respective
defendants' perceptions of threats were unreasonable).
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shareholder action, there are no such markers. Thus, it is quite under-
standable for the court to gravitate toward a "preclusive or coercive"
standard. Of course, Unitrin retained the "range of reasonableness" inquiry,
in the event that an action that is not quite preclusive or coercive might still
be objectionable. This standard has been employed only twice (both times
by the Court of Chancery) in striking down a defensive action161 In one of
those cases, the Delaware Supreme Court subsequently affirmed on
alternative grounds,' 62 and the other case ended prior to any hearing by the
court.
D. Why Fiduciary Duties Cannot Effectively Curb Entrenchment
When faced with a hostile-takeover attempt, managers of a target
corporation are naturally inclined to act defensively. After all, if they were
enthusiastic about the bidder's attentions, the deal would be friendly, not
hostile. When courts are asked to review defensive measures approved by
the target managers, they focus quite rightly on the possibility of
management entrenchment. No widely accepted definition of entrenchment
exists, but in the broadest sense, entrenchment occurs whenever managers
hinder the ability of shareholders to replace them. If this were the notion of
entrenchment accepted by the courts, however, every defensive measure
would be invalidated because takeover defenses necessarily create obstacles
to the ouster of incumbent managers.
Courts do not employ this expansive notion of entrenchment, but
instead strive to distinguish inappropriate defensive actions (that is, defensive
actions that serve the interests of the managers) from appropriate defensive
actions (that is, defensive actions that serve the interests of the shareholders),
But as Easterbrook and Fischel have observed, "There is no signal that
separates intransigent resistance from honest efforts to conduct an auction for
the shareholders' benefit."' 63  In the end, courts are left to evaluate the
substantive impact of the defensive action: What effect does this action have
on the corporation's shareholders?' 64 Courts do not relish the task of
evaluating the impact of business decisions. Judges would rather focus on
the decision-making process. If the process is structured in a manner
designed to produce good results for shareholders-that is, if the decision
makers are disinterested and acting in good faith and with complete
information-then courts will defer, even when the decision seems
161. See Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d 25 (Del. Ch. 1998),
affid sub nom. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998); Chesapeake
Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000).
162. Quicktum Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
163. Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 87, at 1175.
164. Ronald Gilson properly identified the primary tension in this area: "The difficulty.., has
been the courts' inability to distinguish defensive tactics from neutral corporate action, particularly
where dual effects are present." Gilson, Structural Approach, supra note 99, at 875.
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illogical. 165 This is the essence of the business-judgment rule. Generally
speaking, only where the process is infirm do judges turn to a substantive
inquiry into the fairness of the action.
The difficulty courts face in evaluating defensive actions is that the
process is inherently iifrmn because, as noted above, all defensive actions
have an entrenchment effect. Despite this inherent defect in the process,
courts have been unwilling to impose the same level of scrutiny that is
imposed in other cases involving a conflict of interest. Courts before Unocal
applied the business-judgment rule to defensive mechanisms by target
managers, 166 and even when Unocal recognized the inherent conflicts facing
target managers, the Delaware Supreme Court was reluctant to impose the
rigid substantive review (the "fairness" standard) that normally accompanies
cases involving self-interested action. Although Unocal and other cases are
less than clear on the rationale for this reluctance, perhaps courts were
concerned that the "fairness" standard would be outcome determinative in
favor of the plaintiffs, 167 or perhaps they were simply baffled about how to
judge the "fairness" of a defensive action, a problem that Ronald Gilson has
165. Chancellor Allen offered a memorable explanation for this "proceduralist" approach in
Gagliardi v. TriFoods International, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996):
Corporate directors of public companies typically have a very small proportionate
ownership interest in their corporations and little or no incentive compensation. Thus,
they enjoy (as residual owners) only a very small proportion of any "upside" gains
earned by the corporation on risky investment projects. If, however, corporate
directors were to be found liable for a corporate loss from a risky project on the ground
that the investment was too risky (foolishly risky! stupidly risky! egregiously risky!-
you supply the adverb), their liability would be joint and several for the whole loss
(with I suppose a right of contribution). Given the scale of operation of modem public
corporations, this stupefying disjunction between risk and reward for corporate
directors threatens undesirable effects. Given this disjunction, only a very small
probability of director liability based on "negligence," "inattention" "waste," etc.,
could induce a board to avoid authorizing risky investment projects to any extent!
Obviously, it is in the shareholders' economic interest to offer sufficient protection to
directors from liability for negligence, etc., to allow directors to conclude that, as a
practical matter, there is no risk that, if they act in good faith and meet minimal
proceduralist standards of attention, they can face liability as a result of a business loss.
166. Ronald Gilson described the reasoning of a 1969 federal district court case as follows:
"Where dual motives are present-maintaining control and furthering a legitimate corporate
interest-the conflict of interest is eliminated and the appropriate standard ... is the business
judgment rule." Gilson, Structural Approach, supra note 99, at 830 (discussing Northwest Indus. v.
B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. M. 1969)).
167. See, e.g., AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, I11 (Del. Ch.
1986) ("Because the effect of the proper invocation of the business judgment rule is so powerful and
the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the determination of the appropriate standard of judicial
review frequently is determinative of the outcome of derivative litigation. Perhaps for that reason,
the Delaware Supreme Court recognized in [Unocal] that where a board takes action designed to
defeat a threatened change in control of the company, a more flexible, intermediate form of judicial
review is appropriate."); see also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 129, at 248 (stating, with respect
to the fairness standard, "invoking this rigorous standard would simply condemn most defensive
tactics without any justification beyond the standard itself").
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called the "fairness dilemma.' 168 In any event, courts have viewed entrench-
ment as less likely to influence managerial action than more direct conflicts.
This view led to the search for new standards to evaluate defensive actions,
which the court articulated in Unocal.
The challenge facing the Unocal court, therefore, was to create a
standard that would distinguish "good" takeover defenses from "bad"
takeover defenses without using either the business-judgment rule or the
fairness standard. It is often said that "[p]eople who are only good with
hammers see every problem as a nail."'169 In the context of hostile takeovers,
the Delaware judiciary's hammer is fiduciary-duty law, and every question
regarding the propriety of board action looks like a nail. In creating the new
standard of review, therefore, the court naturally turned to fiduciary duty. As
suggested by this metaphor, the failure of Unocal discussed above cannot be
wholly attributed to faulty execution, but rather to the decision to use
fiduciary-duty law to address a problem for which it can provide an
inadequate solution.1 70 In short, fiduciary-duty law is incapable of address-
ing the "omnipresent specter" of self-interest identified in Unocal.17 t
Fiduciary duties in corporate law are designed primarily to address
conflicts between managers and shareholders.172  Modem corporations
statutes allocate managerial power over the corporation to the board of
directors.173 In making decisions, directors are obliged to act in the interests
of the shareholders. At root, fiduciary obligation is best conceived in terms
of loyalty.174 Given our emphasis on the theory of the firm, it is worth
168. Ronald Gilson noted that fairness review is inapt for defensive actions. In reference to
Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964), an early Delaware "greenmail" case. Gilson wrote: "A
conflict of interest existed which, in the court's view and, I think, in fact, was not subject to a
traditional fairness review." Gilson, Structural Approach, supra note 99, at 828.
169. GLENN VAN EKEREN, SPEAKER'S SOURCEBOOK II: QUOTES, STORIES, & ANECDOTES
FOR EVERY OCCASION 304 (1994) (quoting psychologist Abraham Maslow).
170. Park McGinty also concludes that fiduciary duties are not suited to protecting shareholder
interests in the hostile-takeover context, but he limits his explanation to institutional incapacity.
Park McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need for Shareholder Self-Help in an Age
of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163, 261-70 (1997) (pointing out that the process of
valuing a target company requires a degree of financial sophistication that courts are unable to
apply).
171. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
172. For a useful discussion of the roots of fiduciary obligation, see Deborah A. DeMott,
Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L. J. 879, 880-82.
173. Although directors typically delegate authority over ordinary business decisions to
executive officers, directors remain primarily responsible for decisions regarding fundamental
transactions. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) cmt. (1999) ("[D]elegation does not relieve the
board of directors from its responsibility of oversight ...."); see, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 701
(McKinney 1986) ("[Tthe business of a corporation shall be managed under tie direction of its
board of directors .... ); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1721 (West 1995) ("[T]he business and
affairs of every business corporation shall be managed under the direction of a board of directors.").
174. DeMott, supra note 172, at 882 ("If a person in a particular relationship with another is
subject to a fiduciary obligation, that person (the fiduciary) must be loyal to the interests of the other
person (the beneficiary).").
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pausing to note that the duty of loyalty fits comfortably within any theory of
the firm. This duty is most prominent in agency theory,175 but any theory
(including both transaction-cost economics and property-rights theory) that
relies on delegation of control rights from shareholders to managers must
contemplate a duty of loyalty. Even if contracts are incomplete, the duty of
loyalty performs the useful function of ensuring that managers strive to serve
the shareholders.
The problem here is that proportionality review is incapable of
measuring loyalty in this context. As discussed above, the usual method of
evaluating loyalty in the face of conflict is to inquire after the fairness of the
transaction at issue. While Gilson's "fairness dilemma" offers a reasonable
account of why a court might reject this approach, the courts in fact offer an
alternative explanation. They simply doubt whether directors are truly self-
interested. These doubts are manifested through attempts to focus on
director motivation as a means of separating "good" defensive actions from
"bad" defensive actions. For example, in Cheff v. Mathes, the Delaware
Supreme Court reasoned:
[I]f the actions of the board were motivated by a sincere belief that the
buying out of the dissident stockholder was necessary to maintain
what the board believed to be proper business practices, the board will
not be held liable for such decision, even though hindsight indicates
the decision was not the wisest course. On the other hand, if the board
has acted solely or primarily because of the desire to perpetuate
themselves in office, the use of corporate funds for such purposes is
improper. 76
This approach to the problem was carried over to Unocal, where the
Delaware Supreme Court referred to an "omnipresent specter" of self-
interest.177 Implicit in this phrasing is doubt about whether the self-interest
has actually taken hold. Like a specter, self-interest hovers over all defensive
actions, but it seems to take hold only occasionally. In addition, the structure
of the court's argument suggests that it is trying to separate cases of self-
interest from other cases.
This approach is ill conceived. We believe that the primary difficulty in
this area revolves around the fundamental ambiguity of defensive actions
when viewed by a judge. Because every defensive action has an entrench-
ment effect, distinguishing "good" defensive actions from "bad" defensive
actions ultimately requires courts to consider whether the incumbent
managers are too fixed in their positions. Of course, entrenchment may be
consistent with shareholder welfare, so the inquiry must be quite nuanced.
175. See, e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 65, at 751-53.
176. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548,554 (Del. 1964) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
177. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Dcl. 1985).
2001]
Texas Law Review
Unfortunately, as noted above, there are no useful market transactions
against which to compare levels of entrenchment. 78 The only thing we know
for sure is that directors who act in a coercive or preclusive manner have
crossed the line. Thus, the Unitrin standard is an accurate reflection of the
best we can do under fiduciary duties.
Still, we suspect that some defensive actions that fall short of being
coercive or preclusive are nevertheless problematic. This explains Unitrin's
retention of the "range-of-reasonableness" inquiry. That inquiry suffers,
however, from the same ambiguity problem that pushed us toward
"preclusive or coercive" in the first place. The result is that we approach the
inquiry with some trepidation, much like our approach to director actions
under the business-judgment rule, because courts lack the kind of
information that would permit them to verify whether this line has been
crossed. In the end, it appears that the best that fiduciary-duty law has to
offer is prevention of coercive or preclusive behavior, and that limited
constraint is inconsistent with the "omnipresent specter" of self-interest that
hangs over these transactions. 1
79
Facing uncertainty about the primary effect of the director action on the
shareholders' interests, the court seems to use improper motivation as a
surrogate for harm to shareholders.180  In many instances, assuming the
ability to discern director motives, this form of rough justice could yield
correct results; after all, self-serving directors often confer benefits on
themselves at the expense of shareholders. On the other hand, even the best
boards often act out of a desire to perpetuate themselves in office (albeit
through superior performance rather than by erecting barriers to their ouster).
The key distinction between good boards and bad boards, therefore, is not
motivation but whether the boards effectively serve the interests of the
shareholders. Moreover, judges will not be able to obtain and verify
information on that issue sufficient to overcome the deference with which
courts approach any shareholder litigation alleging a breach of fiduciary
duty. Like the incomplete contracts that prompted the formation of a firm in
the first place, the board's performance in this context is not susceptible to
effective judicial oversight. Thus, shareholders will be propelled toward a
nonjudicial method of resolving the conflict.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 163-65.
179. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
180. Interestingly, in Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc., 728 A.2d 25,
44 (Del. Ch. 1988), Vice Chancellor Jacobs found that the board of directors' adoption of the
delayed redemption provision (DRP) was "motivated by a good faith belief that their actions were
in the company's best interests." He reached this conclusion despite the fact that their stated
justification for adopting the DRP was "at war with how the DRP... would actually operate." Id.
at 50.
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V. Creating "Sacred Space" for Shareholder Action
The limits inherent in the existing judge-centered approach to resolving
shareholder-director disputes in takeovers make this is an appropriate time to
reexamine voting and selling as shareholder functions that can act as
alternatives to suing based on fiduciary duty. The change in the shareholder
census-that is, the increased number of institutional shareholders who are
able (and willing) to play a more active role in corporate governance-
strengthens the case for pursuing alternatives to shareholder litigation as the
primary means of resolving takeover disputes. In this Article, we propose an
alternative standard based on the notion of "sacred space" for shareholder
action. In simplest terms, sacred space is an area within which shareholders
can vote or sell their shares without interference from incumbent managers.
This approach is limited and nuanced. It is not the broad, general preference
for shareholder decision-making that frightened judges in the aftermath of
the director passivity discussions of the early 1980s.18 1 It anticipates that
directors may use defensive tactics to protect other constituencies or to gain
higher returns for shareholders, and it reflects fears that shareholders are
capable of using their power to prefer themselves over other corporate
constituencies.1
82
The concept of sacred space emanates from the shareholders' statutorily
defined role in a market-enclosed corporate-governance system. Under
every theory of the firm discussed above, shareholder oversight is viewed as
crucial to the legitimacy of director power, and the most important medium
for shareholder expression is the right to vote.18 3 Although state corporate
law allocates to directors the power to manage the corporation, shareholders
have the ultimate power to determine the direction of the corporation because
they are entitled to elect the directors.184 The importance of this power has
sometimes been discounted on grounds that atomized shareholders have little
incentive to rise up and assert themselves collectively. 1 Nevertheless, the
importance of the shareholder franchise should not be measured by the
181. For an example of a current paper continuing the earlier debate, see MARTN LIPTON &
PAUL K. ROWE, PILLS, POLLS AND PROFESSORS: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR GILSON 5 (N.Y. Univ.
Center for Law and Business, Working Paper #CLB-01-006, 2001), available at
http:lwww.stermunyu.edulclbl, which noted that the underlying struggle between the two polar
points of view have hardly changed in the past twenty years.
182. See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 16 (introducing a "team production theory" to
explain how public corporations reconcile such potential conflicts).
183. See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) ("The
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial
power rests.").
184. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 7.28(a) (1999) ("Unless otherwise provided in the articles of
incorporation, directors are elected by a plurality of the votes cast by the shares entitled to vote in
the election at a meeting when a quorum is present.").
185. Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel described this phenomenon as "rational passivity."
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 15, at 197.
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frequency of proxy contests alone. Instead, the full importance of voting
requires recognition of the potential to aggregate votes by purchasing shares,
usually through a tender offer.
In this section we first identify the core components of shareholder
voting and selling under state corporate law and focus particularly on the
interactive aspect of these two functions. In a legal system such as ours that
values private ordering, new transactions will expose gaps in the permissible
structure. We offer three maxims that should govern judicial questions that
arise regarding sacred space. In the next section we apply those maxims to
active issues arising in a takeover setting.
A. The Interaction of Voting and Selling to Create Sacred Space
The role for shareholder decision-making in corporations is decidedly
complex. Two sets of interactions are discussed here. First, effective
shareholder decision-making necessarily depends on the ability of
shareholders to vote and to sell their shares. In a typical publicly held
corporation, a vote to displace management rarely happens without the
impetus of an offer to purchase made via the market. Further, the selling
option through such a tender offer will not occur without the real possibility
of an effective voting channel to implement the control purchased via the
market. In defining sacred space for shareholder action, therefore, we
consider both voting and selling, first separately and then as they interact.
Second, within each function there is another layer of complexity.
Corporate law provides default rules that are the starting point for analysis,
but various defensive tactics can be employed to constrict the space afforded
shareholders under the default rules. Depending on the nature of the action,
defensive actions may be imposed by directors alone or implemented with
the approval of shareholders. More importantly for purposes of this analysis,
there are antidotes-that is, there are ways available to remove those
defenses. One final bit of complexity is introduced by the fact that the
outcome of a takeover struggle will turn on the order in which the defenses
are imposed and the antidotes attempted, so that there is no single
equilibrium that will result from this process.
1. Shareholder Voting.-The structure of corporate law calls for only
intermittent shareholder oversight in the form of director elections,
shareholder approval of fundamental corporate changes, and similar actions,
but these actions-like the occasional votes of the electorate in representative
democracies-are fundamental to the corporate-governance system. As
Chancellor Allen noted in an eloquent defense of shareholder voting:
It has, for a long time, been conventional to dismiss the stockholder
vote as a vestige or ritual of little practical importance.... [W]hether
the vote is seen functionally as an unimportant formalism, or as an
important tool of discipline, it is clear that it is critical to the theory
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that legitimates the exercise of power by some (directors and officers)
over vast aggregations of property that they do not own.1
6
The effectiveness of shareholder voting power requires that
shareholders be allowed to vote on certain transactions at specified
occasions. In the sections that follow, we discuss both the timing and the
subject matter of shareholder votes.
a. The Statutory Starting Point.-Delaware corporate law requires
an annual meeting of shareholders for the purpose of electing directors.1
t 7
The Delaware statute also allocates to shareholders (on their own initiative)
the power to remove directors and make changes to the corporation's
bylaws.18 8 In addition, shareholders have the responsibility of voting on
certain fundamental transactions-such as amending the corporation's
certificate of incorporation or approving a merger-if first recommended by
the board of directors.
189
In addition to acting at an annual meeting, shareholders can vote at a
special meeting. Under the Delaware statute, however, the only persons
authorized to call a special meeting are the board of directors and other
persons specified in the certificate of incorporation or in the bylaws1 90 A
third forum for shareholder action is the written consent.19' The default rule
as to written consents is more favorable to shareholder action, providing that
shareholders holding a majority of the outstanding shares have a right to act
without a meeting.192
b. Limitations and Defenses That Constrain Shareholder Decision-
Making.-The default rules just described can be circumscribed to severely
limit the powers of shareholders seeking to act against the wishes of a
recalcitrant board of directors. For example, while it would be possible for
the certificate of incorporation to provide that a special meeting could be
called by a majority of shareholders (or even 10% of shareholders as
provided by the Model Business Corporation Act), 193 such a provision does
not exist in the charters of many publicly held corporations. 9' 4  Many
186. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659.
187. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (1991).
188. Id. §§ 141(k), 109(a).
189. Id. §§ 242,251(c); see also id § 271(a).
190. Id. § 211(d).
191. Id. § 228.
192. Id § 228(a). Of course, this default rule may be changed by a provision in the certificate
of incorporation.
193. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.02(a)(2) (1999) (stating that the articles can change the
percentage required but cannot raise it higher than 25%).
194. Cf. Robert Danes & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value?
Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 85 (2001) (sampling 310 firms-
approximately two-thirds of which were controlled by venture capitalists or leveraged buyout
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corporations also have charter provisions eliminating the power of share-
holders to act by written consent. 195
With their ability to act thus restricted to the annual meeting,
shareholders may find additional obstacles in the way of change. Perhaps the
most potent deterrent to a change of control is the staggered board. Under
such a provision, the board of directors is typically divided into three classes
with a roughly equal number of directors in each class. One class is elected
at each annual meeting so that directors serve a staggered three-year term.1
96
By an unusual tying arrangement in the Delaware Code, a corporation that
chooses to have staggered terms also automatically changes the default rule
regarding removal of directors. 97 Instead of the usual default rule permitting
shareholders to remove directors for any reason, directors on a staggered
board can only be removed for "cause," a difficult and time-consuming
process in a public corporation that effectively blocks the use of the removal
power.198 As a result, where the corporation's charter contains a staggered-
board provision, a forced change of control would typically require action at
two annual meetings to elect new directors in two classes.
199
These defensive provisions are often contained in the certificate of
incorporation when the company goes public. 200 Alternatively, they may be
added by amendment of the certificate of incorporation, which shareholders
must approve after a recommendation by the directors.01 In addition to these
limitations, which the shareholders either have notice of or participate in, the
shareholders' ability to act under the statutory default rules might also be
constricted by actions of the directors alone, such as by delaying or
conditioning the use of written consents or acting at special or annual
specialists-that went public over a two-and-a-half-year period (not limited to firms incorporated in
Delaware) and concluding that 24.5% of the firms precluded shareholders from calling a special
meeting and acting by written consent).
195. Id.
196. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (1991) (providing that "the directors of any corporation
organized under this Chapter may, by the certificate of incorporation or by an initial bylaw, or by a
bylaw adopted by a vote of the stockholders, be divided into 1, 2 or 3 classes; the term of office of
those of the first class to expire at the annual meeting next ensuing; of the second class 1 year
thereafter; of the third class 2 years thereafter; and at each annual election held after such
classification and election, directors shall be chosen for a full term, as the case may be, to succeed
those whose terms expire").
197. Id. § 141(k).
198. See Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 861 (Del. Ch. 1957) (finding directors whose
removal was sought were not given a reasonable opportunity to be heard by the stockholders on the
changes made).
199. See, e.g., Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del.
1995); Essential Enters. Corp. v. Automatic Steel Prods., Inc., 159 A.2d 288 (Del. Ch. 1960)
(holding that shareholders could not remove at one meeting board members who had staggered
terms that were set up in the corporation's charter).
200. Daines & Klausner, supra note 194, at 85.
201. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 241 (1991).
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meetings.20 2 Such board actions are reviewed not necessarily under Unocal
(although these actions may well be a defensive tactic), 03 but under the
Blasius line of cases that limit the board's ability to interfere with the
shareholder franchise.
2W
c. Antidotes to the Defensive Tactics.-The effectiveness of efforts
by the board of directors to resist shareholders depends not only on the nature
of the defensive tactic but also on the inability of the shareholders to modify
or remove the defensive provisions. Most of the limitations on voting
described above are contained in the certificate of incorporation, which may
be amended only at the initiation of the board of directors. Thus, an election
ousting a majority of the directors is a precondition to changing the offending
provision, but replacing a majority of the board is practically impossible as
long as the defensive provision is in place. It is a Catch-22. An even more
insulated defense can occur in situations where changing the offending
provisions requires not just a majority of the shareholders but a
supermajority.2 °5
2. Shareholder Selling.-Like the power to vote, the power to sell is a
fundamental right cherished by shareholders. It is not specifically articulated
in corporate codes but, rather, is a part of underlying property rights on
which the corporation statutes rest. In this regard, as in many others, the law
is building on the foundation provided by markets, without the need to
duplicate what the market provides. Thus, the right to sell shares in a
corporation is inherent in the investment, which contemplates the ability to
transfer both control rights (that is, voting rights) and financial rights,
without seeking the permission of other shareholders.0 Historically, the
right to sell has been discussed in the context of a shareholder's individual
sale, an action that-as already discussed-had little governance effect. As
the market for shares has evolved to provide opportunities for sales in
202. See, eg., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437,439 (Del. 1971) (invalidating a
director action to change the date of the annual meeting); Aprahamian v. HBO, 531 A.2d 1204.
1208 (Del. Ch. 1987) (finding inequitable a board's postponement of its annual meeting).
203. The Delaware Supreme Court has blurred the distinction between Unocal and Blasius
suggesting that "[in certain circumstances, (the judiciary] must recognize the special import of
protecting the shareholders' franchise within Unocal's requirement that any defensive measure be
proportionate and 'reasonable in relation to the threat posed."' Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651
A.2d 1361, 1397 (Del. 1995) (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 (Del. 1992)). Yet in
Stroud, the court concluded that a Blasius analysis was inappropriate absent a showing of a primary
purpose to impede exercise of shareholder franchise. Stroud, 606 A.2d at 79.
204. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
205. See Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat'l Intergroup, Inc., 582 Aid 923, 924 (Del. 1990)
(deciding that the corporate charter clearly and unambiguously requires an 80% supermajority vote
in order to enlarge the board of directors).
206. Partnership law, on the other hand, has the opposite default rule. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §
25(2)(b), 6 U.L.A. 700 (1995).
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collective transactions, the selling function's role in corporate governance
has grown. In this section, we address the right of an individual minority
shareholder of a public corporation to sell shares into the market and the
rights of shareholders as a group to sell their shares in a collective
transaction, both rights being part of the market-produced property rights
available to shareholders, but not always equally recognized by Delaware
CoUrtS.
2 07
a. The Statutory Starting Point.-Under the corporate law of
Delaware and other states, the usual rule is that shares of stock are freely
transferable. State corporations codes do not see the need to specify this
basic right of property, but it is implicit in statutory provisions regulating
restrictions on share transfer.20 8 The right to freely sell shares includes the
possibility of a collective sale by a group of shareholders to a third party
desiring to take over the corporation.2°
b. Defenses and Limitations.-The default rule of free
transferability has been limited in several ways since the growth of hostile
takeovers. First, federal law (the Williams Act) regulates the conduct of
bidders seeking to purchase shares, mostly by requiring disclosure, but also
by some substantive regulation. 210  Second, state antitakeover statutes,
refined after the Delaware Supreme Court struck down the first generation of
211
statutes, seek to impose prohibitive costs on what a bidder could do if
207. A recent Delaware Supreme Court case held that certain decisions-such as voting for
directors and making individual buy-sell decisions are for the stockholder, not the court, to make.
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000). The reference to voting for elections does not
negate the other shareholder voting rights inherent in the collective structure. Neither should the
reference to individual selling exclude other means by which shareholders sell. To draw a line
between individual selling decisions and selling decisions made in the context of one bidder
offering to buy the shares of many shareholders fails to give full recognition to the market for
shares. Delaware statutory and common law has never been considered a closed system that ignores
or denies the incentives and effects provided by markets. That underlying foundation evolves just
as the Delaware statutes evolve. See Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited:
Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913,915-
16 (1982).
208. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202 (1991).
209. The statute does not prohibit shareholders from selling collectively and does not assign the
board of directors an intermediary role in such transactions. Id. States' initial antitakeover efforts
to regulate collective sales did not survive constitutional attack. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624, 630-34 (1982). Second-generation state antitakeover statutes therefore focused on business
combinations with a person who has engaged in collective purchases. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
203 (1991). These antitakeover statutes were more successful in surviving constitutional attack,
See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (deciding that it is within a state's
role as the overseer of corporate governance to offer an opportunity to protect shareholders from
takeovers).
210. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(f), 78n (d)-(f) (1994).
211. See, e.g., Edgar, 457 U.S. 624 (finding an Illinois statute to have unduly burdened
interstate commerce).
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successful. 212 Third, and most effective, the unilateral action by the board of
a target company to implement a poison pill makes a hostile takeover so
prohibitively expensive that potential acquirors are unwilling to proceed
without its removal.21 3
c. Antidotes.-The Williams Act and state antitakeover statutes are
beyond our focus, but the poison pill lies at the heart of our concern. The
prohibitive expenses of the poison pill can be avoided by the redemption of
the pill prior to its being triggered. The Delaware Supreme Court, in
approving the initial use of the pill, left open the possibility that a board's
failure to redeem the pill would be judged by the enhanced-scrutiny standard
of Unocal.214 This seemed to open up the possibility that poison pills would
be removed by judicial use of fiduciary duty; indeed, some early Court of
Chancery decisions held that the refusal to redeem a poison pill was a breach
of duty.2t5  Yet in a subsequent decision, the Delaware Supreme Court
criticized those decisions, 21 6 and the federal court in Delaware has applied
Delaware law to suggest that Unocal does not reach so far as to require
redemption of the poison pill.21
7
3. Interaction of Selling and Voting, Defenses, and Antidotes.-Any
explanation of the decision-making role of shareholders can be brought into
focus only if both selling and voting are in view and their interaction is
observed. As noted above, either selling or voting by itself results in no
significant role for shareholders. Consider the most potent antitakeover
defense available to most corporations: the combination of a staggered board,
which limits the effectiveness of a vote to remove the board, and a poison
pill, which limits the use of selling to transfer control. If either mechanism
were removed, shareholders desiring to accept an offer against the wishes of
212. See, e.g., CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 73-75 (upholding Indiana's Control Share Acquisition
Act, which conditions voting rights of block shares acquired in hostile transactions on a vote of
remaining shareholders).
213. See Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1348-49 (Del. 1985) (invlving a rights
plan giving shareholders-but not a hostile bidder-the right to purchase additional shares from the
corporation at half-price upon the occurrence of a hostile takeover).
214. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356.
215. See City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del. CI. 1988);
Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1054-55 (Del. Ch. 1988) (noting that
previous caselaw indicated that, in a noncoercive offer, fiduciary duty might require the board to
redeem poison-pill rights and allow shareholders to choose).
216. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140. 1153 (Del. 1989)
("Plaintiffs' position represents a fundamental misconception of our standard of review under
Unocal principally because it would involve the court in substituting its judgment as to what is a
'better' deal for that of a corporation's board of directors. To the extent that the Court of Chancery
has recently done so in certain of its opinions, we hereby reject such approach as not in keeping
with a proper Unocal analysis. See e.g., Interco, 551 A.2d 787, and its progeny....")
217. See Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545. 1563 (D. Del.
1995).
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the board could quickly, probably within weeks, accomplish their goal. With
both mechanisms in place, the time required to oust the incumbent managers
would instead be measured in months or years.
B. The Core Attributes of Sacred Space
The complexity made possible by the interaction among the various
rules, possible defensive tactics, and antidotes emphasizes the likelihood of
gaps that litigants can exploit and that judges may be asked to fill. If sacred
space is to have staying power, its core attributes must be understandable and
capable of being applied over a range of transactions. We provide three
maxims that seek to capture such attributes, and in the Part that follows we
discuss how they might be applied in several settings that present open
questions in corporate law.
First, sacred space embodies the structure established by positive
corporate law that shareholders participate directly in core governance
decisions. Corporate law gives shareholders the power to vote and sell even
while it gives directors the overall power to manage the business and affairs
of the corporation. Our first maxim highlights the need to recognize the
space within which a well-functioning corporate-governance system requires
shareholder action, the space where directors cannot have absolute authority.
This is readily visible in the statutory provisions specifying large corporate
decisions like mergers that are not left to the directors alone, but must have
the approval of shareholders.218 Statutes also provide the possibility of a
shareholder role when directors have a conflict of interest. More central
than either of these is shareholder action that does not depend on director
initiative-the shareholders' power to vote for directors and to sell their
shares. Hostile takeovers reflect transactions that are large and important and
that pose the potential for director conflict such that some shareholder role
would be expected given the policies just described. These transactions
came of age only with the growth and maturity of an active and developed
takeover market, including the dramatic growth in the role of institutional
shareholders. They exist mostly within markets that corporation statutes
have never addressed in detail. Viewing statutes as if in a vacuum floating
free of the markets in which they are embedded, courts sometimes understate
the power of our first maxim or confine it only to voting.
We emphasize two more specific points that follow from this maxim in
a hostile-takeover setting: (a) shareholders must be allowed to exercise the
decision-making authority given to them by statute at least annually and (b)
218. For example, see mergers, sale of substantially all of the corporate assets, and changes to
the certificate discussed supra in note 189 and the accompanying text.
219. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2) (1991) (permitting shareholder action to remove
the taint of a director when that director is also a director for-or has a financial interest in-it
competing company).
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shareholders should be able to use their antidote power even earlier than the
annual meeting to remove director-installed defensive tactics that would
block the shareholders' right to exercise their power to vote or to sell their
shares.
An important feature of Delaware corporate law is its emphasis on
providing shareholders with an annual opportunity to vote. Chancellor Allen
provided a stalwart defense of that principle in Hoschett v. TSI International
Software, Ltd.:
The annual election of directors is a structured occasion that
necessarily focuses attention on corporate performance. Knowing that
such an occasion is necessarily to be faced annually may itself have a
marginally beneficial effect on managerial attention and performance.
Certainly, the annual meeting may in some instances be a bother to
management, or even, though rarely, a strain, but in all events it
provides a certain discipline and an occasion for interaction and
participation of a kind. Whether it is welcome or resented by
management, however, is in the end, irrelevant under Section 211(b)
and (c) of the DGCL and similar statutes in other jurisdictions. 20
A more difficult question is whether the annual meeting is the only time
that shareholders should be seen or heard.-' That would be a very narrow
definition of the oversight role, which is not compelled by the statutory
structure. If the right to vote is to mean anything, particularly against the
panoply of defensive tactics that can be implemented by directors alone,
shareholders should be able to act by the statutorily prescribed means of
meetings or consents to take action that removes the director-instituted
defensive tactics and restores the space for shareholder decision-making that
the statute intended.222 Shareholders should be able, either at an annual or at
a special meeting or by written consent, to pass a mandatory bylaw that
removes a defensive tactic interfering with the shareholders' right to vote or
sell. Alternatively, shareholders-acting either by resolution or mandatory
bylaw-should be able to trigger the duty of the board of directors to auction
the company to the highest bidder.223 In the Revlon opinion, which first
220. Hoschett v. TSI Int'l Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43,44-45 (Del. Ch. 1996).
221. See, e.g., In re Gaylord Container Corp. S'holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462,469-70 (Del. Ch.
2000) (holding that the Charter and Bylaw Amendments proposed by the Gaylord board served a
rational business purpose when their net effect was to limit shareholders' opportunities to vote in a
single annual meeting). As set out below, we argue that sacred space requires that shareholders be
able to remove director defensive tactics that interfere with their right to vote and to sell. See infra
text accompanying notes 223, 250.
222. As previously mentioned, Delaware permits constraints on shareholder-called special
meetings and action by written consent and permits the use of staggered boards that slow down
shareholder action. These actions can constrict shareholder space, but the default structure suggests
the change should be clear and uncoerced. See supra text accompanying notes 190-204.
223. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings. Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
(holding that when it had become apparent that the breakup of the company was inevitable, "the
20011
Texas Law Review
described the duty to auction, the directors had taken the necessary steps to
put the corporation up for sale. In a subsequent opinion, however, the
Delaware Supreme Court specified that the directors' duty to auction arises
"when a corporation undertakes a transaction" that will cause a change in
control or a breakup of the corporate entity.224 Consistent with a view of
sacred space, shareholders should be able to initiate action that would put the
225company up for sale, leaving it to the board to conduct the auction.
Second, sacred space does not mandate unrestrained shareholder
power. The first maxim recognizes that shareholder decision-making is a
necessary counterbalance to possible deficiencies in director decision-
making, and that shareholder decision-making has a venerated place in
corporate governance alongside judicial constraints based on directors'
fiduciary duties. Yet the particularity of shareholder power and the breadth
of directors' management power will necessarily leave room for director
action that tempers the means by which shareholders act. Sacred space does
not mean that shareholders should be entitled to make an immediate and
direct decision regarding every proposed change in control. For example,
shareholder protection does not require that shareholders be given the
opportunity to accept a tender offer in any time frame specified by the
bidder.2
26
Limiting shareholders' ability to force a quick decision reflects two sets
of concerns. First, the board as a unified bargaining agent for shareholders
can secure a better deal than shareholders would obtain by acting
independently. Chancellor Chandler recently made the point that share-
holders are better off having limits on their power. He pointed to two
prominent examples in which "institutional investors were eager to cash out
on the terms offered by a hostile tender offer" and were opposed by the
corporation's board of directors.227 In both cases, AMP and Quickturn, the
board subsequently secured a substantially better offer from a "white
knight., 228 As the Chancellor put it, "shareholders were better off under the
directors' role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting
the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company").
224. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34,48 (Del. 1993).
225. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1988)
(discussing the specifics of auction responsibility).
226. Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 87, at 1161-63 (arguing that when
shareholders must decide quickly whether to accept a tender offer, the target company has
insufficient time to enact antitakeover strategies that hurt the shareholders in the long run).
227. William B. Chandler I1, On the Instructiveness of Insiders, Independents, and
Institutional Investors, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 1083, 1093-95 (1999).
228. Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d 25 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff'd
sub nomn. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998); AMP Inc. v. Allied
Signal Inc., CIV.A.98-4405, CIV.A.98-4058, CIV.A.98-4109, 1998 WL 967579 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18,
1998); AMP Inc. v. Allied Signal Inc., CIV.A.98-4405, CIV.A.98-4058, CIV.A.98-4109, 1998 WL
778348 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 1998).
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stewardship of their board's business judgment."' ' 9 He suggested that these
examples "should give commentators reason to think twice before decrying a
board's wisdom in holding out (or even rejecting an offer) when it seems that
even the most sophisticated of investors are in total disagreement.' '2
Restraints on shareholder power sometimes reflect skepticism of
shareholder primacy and a concern for other groups who have an interest in
the corporation, a concern that powered the stakeholder movement in the
1980s. Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have suggested an approach to
corporate law based on the notion that boards act as "mediating hierarchs."2''
They suggest that corporate law partially frees directors from direct
accountability to shareholders, allowing them to act as disinterested trustees
representing the interests of all members of the corporate "team." According
to this view, shareholders (and others contributing to team-specific assets)
would be willing to give up control in the hopes of sharing in the benefits
that can flow from team production. 2
Sacred space differs somewhat from either of these views. While
acknowledging that director action will sometimes delay or shape
shareholder action, we expressly recognize that shareholders always retain
the ability to vote or sell and to implement antidotes for defensive tactics so
that shareholders have the ability to determine the result of a takeover in a
real sense, not just in a remote theoretical sense. Our proposal is not one that
says that shareholders and markets should always determine the results of
takeovers. We expressly recognize director ability to temper or delay
shareholder action for the benefit of shareholders or other constituencies.
We believe that this follows naturally from the fact that sacred space builds
on fundamental conceptions of power allocation drawn from corporate
statutes. In other words, sacred space recognizes that shareholders have a
specific role in corporate decision-making, but it also recognizes that this
role is limited by the statutorily assigned functions of voting, selling, and
suing.
Third, sacred space embodies a concept of shareholder self-help, even
when directors are acting in good faith. This maxim most clearly
distinguishes sacred space from the current dominant approach that relies on
judicial constraints via fiduciary duty to address deficiencies in director
decision-making. Sacred space comes from a recognition that judicial inter-
vention has gone as far as it can go. In the place of judicial intervention,
sacred space offers shareholder self-help. This self-help--while limited as
described in the second maxim-is not concerned with whether the directors
were acting in good faith. Shareholders are entitled to act and directors are
229. Chandler, supra note 227, at 1095.
230. Id. at 1095-96.
231. Blair & Stout, supra note 16, at25O.
232. Id. at 276-79.
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prohibited from significantly infringing upon sacred space, regardless of
good faith or motives of the directors. Although sacred space might be said
to fit within a structure described by reference to fiduciary duty, in the sense
that it defines the scope of fiduciary action, it is distinctive in that claims
based on sacred space will be accompanied by a presumption that favors the
shareholders' right of action.
The Delaware courts have some experience, albeit limited, with judicial
review of defensive tactics separate from issues of good faith and motive. In
Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.,233 for example, Chancellor Allen
observed that defensive actions taken "for the primary purpose of thwarting
the exercise of a shareholder vote" 234 must be supported by a "compelling
justification." 235 Most importantly for our purposes, Allen held that the
Blasius board had acted in good faith, but noted that the real question was
whether ... the board, even if it is acting with subjective good faith
(which will typically, if not always, be a contestable or debatable
judicial conclusion), may validly act for the principal purpose of
preventing the shareholders from electing a majority of new directors.
The question thus posed is not one of intentional wrong (or even
negligence), but one of authority as between the fiduciary and the
beneficiary.236
Delaware courts have been reluctant to apply the Blasius standard,
perhaps because the "compelling justification" standard is largely outcome-
237determinative. The judicial analysis usually focuses on whether disenfran-
chisement is the directors' sole or real purpose,23 and courts usually find
some other meaningful purpose and thus evade Blasius. Sacred space, on the
other hand, calls for shareholder action, which may or may not strike down
director action. In short, we believe that sacred space will provide more
meaningful shareholder protection than Blasius.
239
233. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
234. Id. at 660.
235. Id. at 661.
236. Id. at 658.
237. See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1996) ("Blasits' burden of
demonstrating a 'compelling justification' is quite onerous, and is therefore applied rarely.").
238. Consider the most recent and very narrow description of the reach of Blasius by Vice
Chancellor Strine in Chesapeake: "Because the test is so exacting-akin to that used to determine
whether racial classifications are constitutional-whether it applies comes close to being outcome-
determinative in and of itself." Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 319-20 (Del. Ch. 2000)
(footnote omitted).
239. In Chesapeake, Vice Chancellor Strine analyzed the relationship between Blasius and
Unocal/Unitrin, observing:
[T]he preclusion question [under Unitrin] and the issue of the board's "primary
purpose" are not easily separable. The line between board actions that influence the
electoral process in legitimate ways (e.g., delaying the election to provide more time
for deliberations or to give the target board some reasonable breathing room to identify
alternatives) and those that preclude effective stockholder action is not always
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Arguably, the Delaware Supreme Court has begun to move to an
"authority-based" review of defensive actions. In Quickturn Design Systems,
Inc. v. Shapiro, 24  the court declined to apply Unocal to a defensive
mechanism, even after the Court of Chancery held that the "delayed
redemption provision" at issue in the case was a disproportionate response to
the threat perceived by Quickturn's board. For the first time, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that a defensive mechanism was invalid because it
violated "fundamental Delaware law."241  The most intriguing aspect of
Quickturn is the court's conclusion that the delayed redemption provision
violates section 141(a) of the Delaware code because a board's authority to
manage the business and affairs of a corporation has inherent limits.2 42
Although the court's reasoning suggests only that the current board cannot
restrict the power of a future board, it would also support a conclusion that a
board's authority to manage the business and affairs of a corporation is
inherently limited by the power of the stockholders to exercise decision-
making authority for the voting and sale decisions assigned to them.
In the wake of Unocal and Moran v. Household International, Inc.,243
such limits were largely imperceptible. When the Unocal court was consid-
ering the authority of the board to adopt a discriminatory exchange offer, it
reasoned, "The board has a large reservoir of authority upon which to
draw." 244 The court cited this aspect of Unocal in Moran, where the parties
famously battled over the validity of a "flip-over" poison pill. The focal
point of the case was section 157 of the Delaware code,245 which authorizes
the creation and issuance of "rights," but once the court had rejected all of
luminous. Absent confessions of improper purpose, the most important evidence of
what a board intended to do is often what effects its actions have.
In reality, invocation of the Blasius standard of review usually signals that the
court will invalidate the board action under examination. Failure to invoke Blasius,
conversely, typically indicates that the board action survived (or will survive) review
under Unocal.
Given this interrelationship and the continued vitality of Schnell v. Chris.Craft,
one might reasonably question to what extent the Blasius "compelling justification"
standard of review is necessary as a lens independent of or to be used within the
Unocal frame.... Stated differently, it may be optimal simply for Delaware courts to
infuse our Unocal analyses with the spirit animating Blasius and not hesitate to use our
remedial powers where an inequitable distortion of corporate democracy has occurred.
Id. at 320, 323. Given the view of Unocal we have adopted, this says more than enough to
demonstrate the potential (or lack thereof) for Blasius to protect sacred space.
240. 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
241. Id. at 1290.
242. Id at 1292. At this point, the reasoning takes on the flavor of the silly theological
arguments about whether an omnipotent God can create a boulder that is too hea y for that God to
lift.
243. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
244. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953.
245. DEL. CoDEANN. tit. 8, § 157 (1991).
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plaintiffs' arguments that section 157 could not possibly mean rights like
these,"' it stated:
Having concluded that sufficient authority for the Rights Plan exists in
8 DeL C. § 157, we note the inherent powers of the Board conferred
by 8 DeL C. § 141(a), concerning the management of the corporation's
"business and affairs" (emphasis added), also provides the Board
additional authority upon which to enact the Rights Plan.
247
Moran dismissed the possibility of nonfiduciary limits under section
141(a) so curtly and so thoroughly, the issue has barely arisen since. Just
because a board has a "large reservoir of authority,"248 however, should not
give the board omnipotence. Quickturn implicitly recognized this funda-
mental principle.249 The concept of sacred space contemplates that the
primary remedy for shareholders is self-help by initiating their right to vote
and to sell. The actions shareholders may take are limited, but include
shareholders' ability to initiate such actions. Shareholders should be able to
act annually or during an interim period by special meeting or written
consent if defensive actions threaten their ability to vote or to sell. In some
circumstances, however, self-help may be impractical. When director action
threatens immediate and irreparable harm to sacred space, therefore,
shareholders should be allowed to bring a claim for injunctive relief against
the directors.
0
VI. Implications of Sacred Space
We seek to define the appropriate balance between shareholder power
and board authority in corporate takeovers-perhaps the most difficult
question in corporate law. In our presentation, the emphasis is on the recip-
rocal nature of the two realms: an increase in one necessarily reduces the
reach of the other. As a framework for addressing core questions of cor-
porate governance, sacred space necessarily differs from today's dominant
paradigm of fiduciary duty, where the focus is on the board's authority to
make corporate decisions and the limits that should be placed on the board
because of loyalty or care concerns. The primary constraint in this paradigm
246. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1351-53.
247. Id. at 1353 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953) (footnote omitted).
248. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953.
249. See Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1291-92.
250. By invoking the notion of "threat," we intentionally invite comparisons to the first prong
of the Unocal standard, where the Delaware courts have allowed directors to take defensive action
based on an expansive interpretation of potential threats from bidders. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55.
Similarly, we believe that shareholders should be allowed to challenge director defensive actions
any time they threaten shareholder action in the limited areas assigned to shareholders. Obviously,
when discussing actions by the board of directors-the group assigned to protect shareholders-
potential threats assume a different form than threat9 from an outsider. In the Unocal context, the
Delaware courts uphold director actions that are not "draconian." Id. at 955.
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results from judicial interpretations of fiduciary duty. When approached in
this way, the tradeoff is between the efficiency value of centralized board
decision-making versus the effectiveness of judicial constraints on self-
interested or careless board action.
The instincts of the court in Unocal were the right ones. The specter of
entrenchment requires something other than the traditional deference of the
business-judgment rule. For the reasons set out in Part m1, however, judicial
interpretations based on fiduciary duty have produced results that look
remarkably like those we would expect under the business-judgment rule.
The resulting constraints on director decision-making do not live up to the
aspirations of the Unocal court, and they leave shareholders preferring a
governance alternative that does not require courts to depend on unverifiable
information. As described in Part IV, we believe that shareholder action
within the narrow realm provided for shareholders has a greater potential to
achieve the proper balance of power sought by Unocal.
Of course, relying on shareholder action to constrain directors has its
own costs. Until now, the focus on fiduciary duty in the takeover context has
meant that courts and commentators have not explored this trade-off very
thoroughly. The primary costs of shareholder action result from (1) the
inefficiencies inherent in decentralized decision-making and (2) the potential
that selfish shareholder action would inflict harm on other constituencies of
the corporation. The inefficiency of decentralized decision-making is readily
apparent when one considers the costs that would be associated with having a
large number of investors with attenuated involvement with the business
making numerous ordinary decisions. Courts also seem to have some con-
cern that shareholders, if left to their own devices, would sometimes go their
own way, preferring their own interests to those of the corporation as a
whole. For these two reasons and perhaps others, shareholder decision-
making has been limited to a smal class of voting decisions and some
decisions to sell or sue.
The rise of a developed market for corporate control created new space
and new questions as to the relative rights of shareholders and directors.
Chancery Court decisions-such as those in Interco and Grand
Metropolitan-recognized that shareholders should be trusted to decide core
questions such as whether to accept a hostile tender offer.25 Later Delaware
Supreme Court decisions-such as Unitrin and Time Warner-took a
narrower view of shareholder decision-making, holding that the only
required channel of expression was the ability to turn directors out in a proxy
contest, not to sell via accepting a hostile tender offerY52 Because of the
251. See City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 797-98 (Del. Ch.
1988); Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1057-60 (Del. Ch. 1988).
252. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388 (Dcl. 1995); Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (1989).
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focus on director authority in these cases, the justification for the distinction
between shareholder authority in selling as contrasted to shareholder
authority in voting was not well developed and indeed has been criticized by
commentators and judges. The reality of takeover transactions in the last
decade has been that proxy contests most often occur when they are backed
by a hostile tender offer. In that setting, a shareholder decision to oust direc-
tors via a proxy action so that a hostile tender offer will go forward seems
little different in substance than a shareholder decision to respond to a hostile
tender offer.
Limiting shareholder decision-making to election of directors permits
shareholders only indirect control over corporate policy. Such a limit might,
in form, be supported by a distrust of direct shareholder action that parallels
concern for direct decision-making by the populace under the United States
Constitution. But given the reality of current transactions, that seems like a
charade. When shareholders decide to give a proxy to a director slate sup-
porting a pending tender offer, it is little different from deciding to tender
their shares in response to the offer.253 While shareholder action is limited,
the baseline rights include both voting and selling that is made possible
because of the presence of a market. We prefer a focus on sacred space that
permits shareholders to take substantially similar acts and recognizes that if
there is concern about shareholder excess, the limited realm for shareholder
action provides a sufficient limit. To draw on an analogy used by the court
in Unitrin, an effective overview role for shareholders would permit them to
lower the gates erected by the directors to defend the corporate bastion if the
shareholders believed that the overture was indeed favorable, but it would
not authorize the shareholders to seek out its own barbarian.
To illustrate how sacred space would resolve concrete issues in the
takeover setting, we offer two examples, one-the "just-say-no" defense-
that arises from a challenge to the board's authority to take defensive action,
and the other-shareholder-adopted bylaws-that is framed by the
shareholders' authority to act. By looking at the same issue from these two
different perspectives, we hope to highlight the common threads in sacred
space. Moreover, the validity of the "just-say-no" defense and shareholder-
adopted bylaws are both open questions in Delaware. We believe these
difficult issues can be usefully examined based on sacred space. This section
concludes with a general discussion of issues that lie between these two.
253. In commenting on a draft of this paper, Professor Lawrence Hamermesh rightly noted that
a proxy vote is different from a share tender in that the latter results in the end of any opportunity to
secure a higher price. By contrast, when shareholders elect a board of directors, that board is
obligated to maximize the value of the corporation, even if that means seeking a higher bid from
some other party. This clarification is useful in thinking about voting generally, but we believe that
voting in most hostile takeover contexts relates exclusively to the merits of the proposed transaction
and that only in the most exceptional circumstances would an insurgent board of directors seek a
different transaction after taking office.
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A. "Just Say No"
"Just say no" is a label used to describe a context in which a board of
directors attempts to stonewall a hostile takeover bid indefinitely. The
acceptability of the 'just-say-no" defense under Delaware law is uncertain.
Although several decisions rendered by the Delaware Supreme CourtP and
numerous commentators seem to support its use, Unitrin's condemnation of
"preclusive" actions would suggest that "just saying no" is an unacceptable
response to a hostile bidder. The Delaware Supreme Court has never directly
decided the issue, but the federal district court in Delaware relied on
precedent from the court to authorize a 'just-say-no" defense in Moore Corp.
v. Wallace Computer Services, Inc.255 The fact that some courts and
commentators consider the 'just-say-no" defense a plausible approach to
corporate governance reflects how far we have strayed from the notion that
shareholders should have a meaningful voice in corporate affairs. Under the
concept of sacred space, "just say no" is not a close case.
Moore involved a claim that the board of directors of Wallace Computer
Services breached its fiduciary duties by refusing to redeem a poison pill in
the face of an all-cash tender offer representing a substantial premium over
the market price.y The directors of Wallace rejected the offer from Moore
Corporation as "inadequate" after considering the views of Wallace's
investment bankers, even though Wallace's shareholders had tendered over
73% of the outstanding shares. Moore was unable to proceed immediately
with its takeover bid because Wallace had a lethal combination of defensive
mechanisms: a poison pill (which would be triggered upon the purchase of
20% of the outstanding shares)2 7 acted to bar shareholder action by selling,
and a staggered board-created in the corporate charter and dividing the
254. For an excellent discussion of Paramount Conmunications, Inc. s. Time Inc., 571 A.2d
1140 (Del. 1989) and Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995), see
Gordon, supra note 6, at 522-27. See also Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.,
637 A.2d 34, 42 n. 11 (Del. 1993) (protecting stockholder rights from "unwarranted interferencc");
Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 82-83 (Del. 1992) (holding that the Unocal heightened standard of
review did not apply when a board's defensive actions were later ratified by a shareholder vote);
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (holding that using "corporate
machinery and the Delaware law" to obstruct "legitimate" efforts of dissident stockholders in the
exercise of their rights to undertake a proxy contest against management was "contrary to the
established principles of corporate democracy").
255. 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995). On the other hand, several cases decided by the
Delaware Court of Chancery appear to lean against its use. See Kidsco v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483
(Del. Ch. 1995), aftd, 670 A.2d 1338 (Del. 1995); Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115
(Del. Ch. 1990). In Interco, Chancellor Allen left open the possibility that "just say no" would pass
muster, but noted that he only "occasionally encountered" such a case. City Capital Assocs. Ltd.
P'ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787,798 (Del. Ch. 1988).
256. The initial offer was at a 27% premium to the market price as of the date of the
announcement of the offer. Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545,
1551 (D. Del. 1995). After the initial offer was rejected, Moore raised it, offering a premium of
over 35%. See hi at 1553 (stating that the offer price rose from $56 to $60).
257. Id. at 1551 n.4.
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board into three classes-blocked any immediate shareholder control action
by voting. 8
Wallace's recalcitrance would force Moore to challenge the incumbent
directors in two annual meetings to obtain majority control of the board of
directors. And of course, Moore would need majority control of the board
before redeeming the poison pill. Despite these obstacles, the district court
held that retention of the pill was not "preclusive" under Unitrin because the
bidder still had the option of replacing incumbent management through a
proxy contest. Strangely, the court did not mention the fact that the board of
directors of Wallace was classified, so that a successful proxy challenge
would need to stretch over two annual elections.
We find the Moore court's unwillingness to order the redemption of the
poison pill completely understandable when framed solely by Unitrin,
looking only at the impact on voting and seeking reasons not to trust the
directors' action. After all, the defensive mechanisms employed by Wallace
did not preclude a takeover.259 Yet viewed in the larger frame, director
action effectively blocked shareholder oversight.
258. WALLACE COMPUTER SERVS., INC., FORM 8-K § 3.2 (June 14, 1995), available at
http:llwww.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/104348/0000104348-95-000008.txt.
259. They merely delayed the takeover for the time required to hold two annual meetings,
Indeed, less than one week after the district court's decision, Moore elected three of its nominees to
the Wallace board of directors at the 1995 annual meeting. Wallace Computer Services Inc.t
Moore-Nominated Directors Gain Three Seats on Board, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 1995, 1995 WL-
WSJ 9912816. Moore's interest in acquiring Wallace remained alive until shortly before the 1996
annual meeting, when it announced that it had developed an alternative business strategy. Steven
Lipin & Larry M. Greenberg, Moore Drops Bid to Acquire Wallace Computer, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7,
1996, 1996 WL-WSJ 3113520. It is interesting to note that when Wallace's chief executive officer
resigned in January 2000, after seven years at the head of the firm, the market value of the company
was less than the value of Moore's hostile bid, which the board determined was "inadequate."
Wallace CEO Quits After 33-Year Career, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2000, 2000 WL-WSJ 3014700.
Despite any disappointment, he might take solace in the fact that he outlasted his rival at Moore by
three years. See Moore Corp. Chief Resigns After String of Earnings Setbacks, WALL ST. J., Oct.
23, 1997, 1997 WL-WSJ 14170966 (reporting the resignation of Moore's chief executive officer,
Reto Braun).
The court also discussed whether the refusal to redeem the poison pill would fall outside the
range of reasonableness. In this aspect of the opinion, the court does not weigh the relative burden
of the defensive mechanism against the seriousness of the threat. Instead, the court assumes the
deferential posture normally associated with business-judgment review:
The evidence demonstrates that the Wallace Board reasonably believed that the
shareholders were entitled to protection from what they considered to be a "low ball"
offer. After substantial capital investment spanning several years, Wallace had finally
begun to reap the financial benefits from its WIN system. These benefits, however,
were reflected in data which remained peculiarly within the province of the Wallace
Board. Shareholders, at the time of the Moore offer, were unable to appreciate the
upward trend in Wallace's earnings which have been set forth in detail above, Given
this situation, the Wallace Board's response can hardly be deemed unreasonable.
Moore, 907 F. Supp. at 1563 (citations omitted). This deferential attitude was encouraged by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Unitrin, where it wrote: "The ratio decidendi for the 'range of
reasonableness' standard is a need of the board of directors for latitude in discharging its fiduciary
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In contrast with Moore, the recent Delaware Chancery Court decision in
Carmody v. Toll Brothers,2W' provides an example of when Unitrin's
preclusive/coercive standard would work to preserve space for shareholder
action. In Carmody, the court invalidated a "dead-hand" poison pill, which
with its cousin the "no-hand poison pill" has been one of the most discussed
takeover innovations over the past decade. Both arose in response to a fatal
shortcoming in traditional poison pills (viewed from the perspective of the
target): the ability of hostile bidders to use the one channel remaining open
for shareholder action after Unitrin to wage a proxy context to replace
incumbent directors with new directors who would then redeem the pill. In
the absence of a charter provision creating a classified board, every cor-
poration whose shares are widely held is susceptible to attack in this manner.
Indeed, waging a proxy contest in conjunction with a tender offer has
become standard practice for hostile bidders. Imposing a classified board, if
not already in place, requires an amendment to the charter and thus a vote of
shareholders. Institutional shareholders have become more reluctant to
support such changes.
261
To close this gap in a target's defensive armada in a way that could be
achieved by directors alone, corporate boards began adding "continuing-
director" provisions to their poison pills. These provisions typically pro-
scribe the removal of the poison pill by anyone other than the current
directors or their approved successors and have been aptly named "dead-
hand poison pills." In Carmody, the only Delaware case addressing dead-
hand poison pills, Vice Chancellor Jacobs found both statutory and fiduciary
grounds for invalidating the device. 2
duties to the corporation and its shareholders when defending against pereived threats. The
concomitant requirement is for judicial restraint." Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1388.
260. 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998).
261. See John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill- A Critique of the
Scientific Evidence, 79 TEXAS L. REV. 271, 325 (2000) ("Charter amendments to install such
defenses are increasingly rare, mainly because amendments require shareholder approval. Since the
institutional shareholder community organized in the late 1980s, such approvals became
increasingly difficult (if not impossible) to obtain.").
262. Vice Chancellor Jacobs concluded that the dead-hand pill was preclusive because it made
the "bidder's ability to wage a successful proxy contest and gain control either 'mathematically
impossible' or 'realistically unattainable."' Cannody, 723 A.2d at 1195. He also held that the
dead-hand poison pill "purposefully disenfranchises" shareholders and violates the "compelling
justification" standard from Blasius. Id. at 1193 (citation omitted). Two other courts have
addressed the validity of dead-hand pills. Bank of New York Co. v. Irving Bank Corp., 528
N.Y.S.2d 482, 485 (Sup. Ct. 1988) was an early case in which a New York court held that the
continuing-director provision produced an "illegal discrimination" between the incumbent board
and any board consisting of newly elected, insurgent directors. In Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne
Techmologies, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997), a federal district court in Georgia upheld a
dead-hand poison pill under Georgia law, reasoning that incumbent directors possessed the
authority to define the terms of the rights and that references to "continuing directors" in two
sections of the Georgia statute provided evidence that "the concept of continuing directors is an
integral part of a takeover defense and is not contrary to public policy in Georgia." Id. at 1581
(citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-1111, 14-2-1133 (1994)).
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Prior to Carmody, several commentators had criticized dead-hand
poison pills on the grounds that they infringe impermissibly on shareholder
suffrage.263 Jeffrey Gordon, for example, characterized these pills as a "just-
say-never" defense.264 Vice Chancellor Jacobs relied heavily on these
commentators in concluding that dead-hand poison pills are a "show
stopper.' '265  His assumption was that dead-hand poison pills are
insurmountable, even if a hostile bidder is able to obtain control of the board
of directors through a proxy contest. Yet Peter Letsou has identified a
channel that remains open to shareholders even in the face of a dead hand:
after a successful proxy fight and election of new directors, the new board
would not act to redeem the pill, but rather could propose a merger or similar
transaction. 266 This is not to argue that dead-hand poison pills should be
permitted, but is intended to illustrate the fragility of a legal standard that
requires judges to draw a line based on evaluating director actions. By
contrast, shareholders have the power of self-help under sacred space. The
implicit policy judgment underlying Moore and Carmody appears to be that
director defensive action is permitted as long as one voting channel remains
263. See Gordon, supra note 6, at 544-51 (advocating that shareholders assert control over
dead-hand poison pills by amending bylaws); Shawn C. Lese, Note, Preventing Control from the
Grave: A Proposal for Judicial Treatment of Dead Hand Provisions in Poison Pills, 96 COLUM, L,
REv. 2175 (1996) (arguing that dead-hand provisions serve only to entrench management and
infringe on shareholder sovereignty); Daniel A. Neff, The Impact of State Statutes and Continuing
Director Rights Plans, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 663 (1997) (citing the recent emergence of state laws
protecting directors' discretion in the takeover context that thwart the shareholder-voting process);
Recent Case, Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Technologies, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997),
111 HARV. L. REV. 1626 (1998) (arguing that continuing-director provisions interfere with
shareholder voting rights and should be carefully scrutinized by courts); Meredith M, Brown &
William D. Regner, Shareholder Rights Plans: Recent Toxopharmacological Developments,
INSIGHTS, Oct. 1997, at 2, 2-4.
264. Gordon, supra note 6, at 522.
265. Carmody, 723 A.2d at 1187 ("(I]f only the incumbent directors or their designated
successors could redeem the pill, it would make little sense for shareholders or the hostile bidder to
wage a proxy contest to replace the incumbent board. Doing that would eliminate from the scene
the only group of persons having the power to give the hostile bidder and target company
shareholders what they desired: control of the target company (in the case of the hostile bidder) and
the opportunity to obtain an attractive price for their shares (in the case of the target company
stockholders).").
266. See Peter V. Letsou, Are Dead Hand (And No Hand) Poison Pills Really Dead?, 68 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1101 (2000). He suggests a pill could be rewritten to apply to corporate transactions
that follow a successful proxy solicitation but no subsequent acquisition of shares by the bidder:
Accordingly, if dead-hand and no-hand poison pills are to be made effective, the
triggering provisions of those pills must be changed so that they apply to all acquisition
techniques. In other words, the flip-over provisions of the current generation of poison
pills, which only apply to mergers and assets sales occurring after a person or group
acquires the specified percentage of the target firm's shares, must be made applicable
to all mergers and asset sales. Only then will no-hand and dead-hand provisions
achieve their goal of preventing bidders from using proxy contests and consent
solicitations to attain the power necessary to acquire the corporation's business without
the consent of incumbent managers.
Id. at 1155.
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open for shareholder activity-no matter how narrow that channel might be.
The result is that there is no effective shareholder oversight of director action
in a situation where there is the possibility of entrenchment. This violates the
first maxim of sacred space.
Section 141 neither mandates nor forbids such action. Any answer
should be informed by the shareholder and director roles as contemplated by
the statutory structure, one that provides ample room for director action, as
long as it is accompanied by shareholder oversight. Sacred space moves the
focus away from preclusion to recognizing space for shareholder action to
protect shareholder fights to vote or to sell as the explicit policy base,
providing the balance that Unocal sought and subsequent cases have been
unable to provide.
B. Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws
Shareholder-adopted bylaws, which have only recently become
prominent in corporate-governance debates, provide a second setting
illustrating shareholder-director conflict. This setting focuses more on the
affirmative role of shareholders in the corporate structure. Most legal discus-
sions of shareholder-adopted bylaws begin with a comparison of section
109(b)267 (describing the permissible scope of corporate bylaws) and section
141(a)268 (describing the management role of the board of directors) of the
Delaware statute, which create what Professor Jeffrey Gordon calls a
"recursive loop."269  As a result of the statutory ambiguity, any final
resolution regarding the validity of shareholder-adopted bylaws will require
the intervention of the Delaware courts. We believe that preservation of
sacred space requires the use of mandatory shareholder bylaws, and that the
proper scope of such bylaws follows naturally-if not always
unambiguously-from this purpose.
The Delaware corporation statute authorizes shareholders to adopt
bylaws "not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation,
relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its
rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers
or employees." 270 On the other hand, the statute charges the directors with
management of the "business and affairs" of the corporation, "except as may
be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation."2'7
When the statute authorizes shareholder-adopted bylaws only to the extent
267. DEL. CODE ANN. it. 8, § 109(b) (1991).
268. Id. § 141(a).
269. Gordon, supra note 6, at 546. See also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can
Institutions Change the Outcome of Corporate Control Contests?, 51 U. MIA1I L REV. 605, 616-
19 (1997); Lawrence A. Hanermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws:
Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409, 428-33 (1998).
270. DEL CODE ANN. t. 8, § 109(b) (1991).
271. Id. § 141(a).
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that they are "not inconsistent with law," does that "law" include the
provision granting managerial authority to directors?272 Similarly, when the
statute authorizes directors to manage the firm subject to limitations
"otherwise provided in this chapter," does that include limitations imposed
by the shareholders through bylaw?
273
Most commentators who have considered these questions have
concluded that the two sections of the Delaware statute cannot be reconciled
without appeal to policy arguments.z74 Two recent commentators have
peered into the statutory abyss and professed to see more clearly the intention
of the Delaware legislature, 75 but the fact that they reached opposite
conclusions supports our view that the plain words of the statute are too
contradictory to be interpreted without employing external policy
considerations.
Professor Jonathan Macey finds authorization for shareholder-adopted
bylaws in the exceptions clause of section 141(a)276 ("except as may be
otherwise provided in this chapter") and in the "clear and unequivocal
language of section 109(b). ''277 While we agree with Professor Macey's
conclusion that shareholder-adopted bylaws can limit director power to some
extent-and we recognize that his conclusion is not based on his reading of
the statutory language alone, but also on his views regarding the proper role
of target shareholders-we find the foregoing reasoning too facile. The
language of section 109(b) is not "clear and unequivocal," and Macey's
reading of it completely ignores the requirement that bylaws be "not
inconsistent with law"--a phrase that presumably includes section 141(a),
An alternative reading of the statute was provided in a thoughtful article
by Professor Lawrence Hamermesh, who offers this resolution of the
apparent conflict in the code:
When section 141(a) refers to limitations on board authority "provided
in this chapter," it does not refer to all by-laws that could conceivably
be adopted pursuant to the general authority conferred by section
109(b). Rather, section 141(a) is more naturally read to refer to
statutes which address its specific subject matter-the allocation of
managerial power to the board of directors-and which clearly and
explicitly depart from that allocation by providing for management by
272. Id. § 109(b).
273. Id. § 141(a).
274. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 269, at 607-10 (describing the alternative readings of the
provisions, then turning to the common law and SEC no-action letters for interpretive guidance);
Gordon, supra note 6, at 547 (arguing that "statutory formalism really runs out").
275. See Hamermesh, supra note 269, at 469-72 (discussing the authority of the board of
directors to amend or repeal stockholder-adopted bylaws); Jonathan R. Macey, The Legality and
Utility of the Shareholder Rights Bylaw, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 865-71 (discussing whether
shareholder-adopted bylaws infringe on the power of the board of directors) (1998).
276. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
277. Macey, supra note 275, at 868.
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persons other than directors. These statutes explicitly permit court-
appointed trustees, custodians and receivers to manage the affairs of
the corporation in lieu of the board of directors.
278
While this reading seems plausible, it leaves unanswered the crucial
question with respect to shareholder-adopted bylaws. By providing for
limitations on director authority, section 141(a) certainly "does not refer to
all by-laws that could conceivably be adopted pursuant to the general
authority conferred by Section 109(b)," but does it refer to any shareholder-
adopted bylaws? In other words, may shareholders in some circumstances
limit director power through bylaws? Presumably, any bylaw adopted by
shareholders would limit director power in the matter addressed, unless
directors are allowed to amend the bylaw to undo the shareholder action.
Professor Hamermesh would permit shareholder-adopted bylaws on matters
where there is "specific statutory authorization," such as for calling a special
meeting of shareholders. 279 While his approach has some appeal, we find no
language in section 109(b) that limits the use of shareholder-adopted bylaws
to actions for which there is independent statutory authorization. Indeed, the
statute, which allows action on "the business of the corporation" and "the
conduct of its affairs," is conspicuously broader than that interpretation.28 In
the last analysis, we find Professor Hamermesh's reading incongruous with
our understanding of the statutory scheme, and it is certainly inconsistent
with sacred space.
Rather than attempting to rationalize two provisions that are facially
inconsistent, we side with Professor Gordon, who concludes that the
"Delaware court needs a theory to explain the appropriate boundary between
shareholder power and the board's authority-a theory presumably richer in
normative appeal than 'management wins. ' ' 2Ul A federal district court in
Oklahoma faced exactly this issue in International Brotherhood of Teamsters
278. Hamermesh, supra note 269, at 431.
279. He notes that his reasoning does "not imply that the nearly universal power of
stockholders to adopt bylaws is merely nominal and without consequence. There are numerous
fields in which bylaw regulation is of nearly unchallengeable validity, due to specific statutory
authorization." Id. at 479-80. For example, Professor Hamermesh argues that bylaws permitting
shareholders to call special meetings are authorized by § 211 (d) and would not "contravne[l the
more general allocation of corporate authority to the board of directors." Id. at481. He uses similar
reasoning with regard to bylaws establishing director qualifications, bylaws affecting board
governance, and bylaws affecting corporate offices. Id. at 482-86.
280. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (1991).
281. Gordon, supra note 6, at 547. Gordon proposes a theory of shareholder choice under
which courts would ask, "[Wlhat would shareholders choose to have initiative power over?" Id.
While we are sympathetic to Gordon's approach, we are skeptical that courts would engage in such
an open-ended inquiry in a matter of such fundamental importance to the corporate-governance
system. By contrast, sacred space provides a more grounded starting point because it is tied to
statutory norms.
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General Fund v. Fleming Co. 282  Under a statute very similar to
Delaware's, 28 3 the court reasoned:
In the scheme of corporate governance the role of shareholders has
been purposefully indirect. Shareholders' direct authority is limited.
This is true for obvious reasons. Large corporations with perhaps
thousands of stockholders could not function if the daily running of
the corporation was subject to the approval of so many relatively
attenuated people. However, the authority given a board of directors
under the Oklahoma General Corporation Act, [citing the Oklahoma
equivalent of Delaware's section 141(a)] is not without shareholder
oversight, [citing the Oklahoma equivalent of Delaware's section
109(b)]. 21
In this reasoning, we see the foreshadowing of sacred space. Unable to
resolve the issue from the plain words of the statute, the court appealed to the
respective governance roles of shareholders and directors, as prescribed in
the statute.
Despite the foregoing, the issue of whether shareholders are allowed to
adopt bylaws is not difficult because the statute expressly grants shareholders
that authority. 285 Instead, the difficult issue relating to shareholder-adopted
bylaws is defining the point at which the shareholders cross the line that
divides shareholders and directors. Several commentators have ventured
proposals to resolve this issue, 6 but these efforts are hobbled by the need to
import artificial distinctions into the statute.28 7
Sacred space not only provides a rationale for validating the use of
shareholder-adopted bylaws, but it provides the limiting principle. Because
sacred space derives from the limited role assigned to shareholders under the
statute, shareholder-adopted bylaws justified by sacred space are not open to
282. 975 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1999). A federal district court in Georgia faced a similar issue in
Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Technologies, 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997). The court rejected
a bylaw that would have required the board of directors to remove the dead-hand feature of a poison
pill. Id. at 1582. However, the statute in that case is substantially different from the Delaware
statute.
283. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1013(A) & (B) (West 1999) ((A)... "[Tihe power to
adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the shareholders entitled to vote .... (B) The bylaws may
contain any provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to
the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or
powers of its shareholders, directors, officers or employees.").
284. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 975 P.2d at 911.
285. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (1991) ("After a corporation has received any payment
for any of its stock, the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the stockholders entitled
to vote .... ).
286. See Coffee, supra note 269, at 613-16; Gordon, supra note 6, at 547-50.
287. Cf. Hamermesh, supra note 269, at 444 (concluding that "the efforts to distinguish by-laws
that permissibly limit director authority from by-laws that impermissibly do so have failed to
provide a coherent analytical structure, and the pertinent statutes provide no guidelines for
distinction at all").
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the same type of abuse that would follow more open-ended authorizations.
In other words, allowing shareholders to limit director authority through
bylaws based on self-protection of shareholder sacred space does not give the
shareholders carte blanche to manage the corporation.
Sacred space also addresses the thorny issue of whether directors should
be allowed to amend or repeal shareholder-adopted bylaws to undo the
reforms. The Delaware statute is silent on these issues.m It vests the power
to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws in the shareholders, and allows the
certificate of incorporation to confer that power on the directors. 9 The fact
that directors are given such power, however, "shall not divest the
stockholders... of the power, nor limit their power to adopt, amend or
repeal by-laws.' 29g One might argue that this last clause empowers share-
holders to override directors, but not vice versa,291 but this reading seems like
a stretch. Moreover, as Professor Hamermesh observes:
If the board of directors derives unqualified authority to amend the by-
laws from the certificate of incorporation, as it almost invariably does,
and the by-laws may not contradict the superior provisions of the
certificate of incorporation, a by-law purporting to limit authority
conferred upon the directors by charter provision should be suspect, to
say the least.
292
We are left, then, as we were before, with an ambiguous statute and the
need for policy to resolve the ambiguity. Again, we lean on sacred space.
We need not-like the Model Business Corporation Act-construct rules that
preclude amendment when (and only when) the shareholders specifically
include a protective statement in the bylaws.293 Instead, we would propose
that shareholder-adopted bylaws be protected from subsequent amendment
by directors if that subsequent amendment would infringe on sacred space.
Where no such infringement would occur, the directors are free to amend.
Note that this solution would allow for the tailoring of bylaws when
shareholders are overly aggressive, but would not allow directors to undo
shareholder efforts to protect sacred space.
288. The Model Business Corporation Act prohibits the board of directors from amending a
bylaw when the shareholders "expressly provide that the board of directors may not amend, repeal.
or reinstate that bylaw." MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §10.20(b)(2) (1999).
289. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (1991).
290. Id.
291. Professor Hamermesh describes a similar argument under the New York statute. See
Hamermesh, supra note 269, at 468-69.
292. Id. at470.
293. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACr § 10.20(b) (1999) ("A corporation's board of directors may
amend or repeal the corporation's bylaws, unless: (1) the articles of incorporation or section 10.21
reserve that power exclusively to the shareholders in whole or in part; or (2) the shareholders in
amending, repealing, or adopting a bylaw expressly provide that the board of directors may not
amend, repeal, or reinstate that bylaw.").
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C. Questions at the Edges
Regulating takeover defense requires broad standards rather than
targeted rules. The high stakes in many control contests-when combined
with the broad leeway for private ordering in the American legal system and
the breadth of action permitted directors under corporate statutes-means
that directors and their lawyers have both the incentive and the means to
develop innovative defensive tactics that push the boundaries of traditional
practice. Even with sacred space, we acknowledge that difficult questions
will remain-particularly as to antitakeover defenses implemented by
directors in which shareholders would normally not participate.
Corporations utilize numerous antitakeover defenses. Golden parachutes,
which are contracts between the corporation and certain of its employees, are
one such example.294 Corporations have also made use of Employee Stock
Ownership Plans ("ESOPs"), which are contracts between the corporation
and its shareholders, 295 and termination fees or lockups, which are contracts
between the target corporation and a preferred bidder.296 Existing law based
on fiduciary duty arguably provides some constraint as to those actions, but
the constraints are spotty.297 Our preferred solution focuses on shareholder
self-help; it could also guide judicial response to these director actions in
settings where director action occurs as part of a board-proposed alternative
to an announced proxy fight or tender offer. In such a setting a board's
contracts with third parties cannot trump the shareholders' right to take
action within their reserved space. Existing authority reflects such a
principle in merger cases where board contracts with a preferred bidder
294. Golden parachutes provide generous payments to managers and sometimes to other
employees if control of the corporation changes. They do not directly block takeovers, but can
make them more expensive. See, e.g., Richard A. Lambert & David F. Larcker, Golden Parachutes,
Executive Decision-Making, and Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179 (1985) (describing a
study of 90 firms with golden parachutes).
295. The use of an employee stock-ownership plan may permit stock to be placed in friendly
hands. Such a plan is often funded with borrowed money and provides cover to directors while
purporting to be justified by general compensation goals. Compare Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v.
Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989) (sustaining an ESOP under an entire fairness
standard) with NCR Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 761 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (invalidating
an ESOP).
296. Lockups have produced a vigorous academic debate. Cf Ian Ayres, Analyzing Stock Lock-
Ups: Do Target Treasury Sales Foreclose or Facilitate Takeover Auctions, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 682
(1990) (noting that stock lockups alone will not preclude a bid or prevent a rival from outbidding);
Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1539 (1996) (stressing the importance of close judicial scrutiny of lockups due to the potential
for negative effects on the incentive structure); Stephen Fraidin & Jon Hanson, Toward Unlocking
Lockups, 103 YALE L.J. 1739 (1994) (arguing that all lockups should be enforced subject only to
business-judgment-rule scrutiny).
297. See, e.g., Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993)
(holding that lockups are permitted in some situations, although they are not permitted when they
are inconsistent with directors' fiduciary duties).
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cannot foreclose shareholder action on a competing bid?9 8 The Delaware
Supreme Court has held that a preferred bidder's contract with a target in
violation of the board's fiduciary duty is invalid and unenforceable. 299
Sacred space suggests similar protection for other shareholder actions, and
the presence of an announced proxy fight or tender offer is a particularly
strong signal announcing such space for shareholder decision-making.
This idea is reflected in a federal decision enjoining a "comprehensive
plan" taken by the board of ITT Corporation to fend off a hostile bid from
Hilton Hotels that would have split 1TT into three new entities, the largest
one with a staggered board requiring a shareholder vote of 80% to remove
the provision.300 The court noted that shareholders have two forms of action:
"They may sell their stock or vote to replace incumbent board members."'3
°t
It held that "the Comprehensive Plan would violate the power relationship
between iT's board and T's shareholders by impermissibly infringing on
the shareholders' right to vote ... Where shareholders seek to exercise
their right to vote or sell, this precedent supports enjoining director action.
Similarly, sacred space will help define the boundary of other fiduciary-
duty concepts such as the Revlon duty to auction.303 Not surprisingly for a
doctrine based on fiduciary duty, Revlon focuses entirely on the directors'
realm. Subsequent opinions such as Paramount v. Time that severely limited
the reach of the Revlon duty also focus only on the director's role in the
corporations.304 What would happen if this approach were linked with a
recognition of shareholder space? In that setting, it is relevant not only that
the directors of Time had a plan for their business, but also that the
shareholders had been asked to vote on that plan, and that the actions of the
directors in the face of a higher offer from Paramount excluded the
shareholders from that role. 30 5 In that setting, the shareholders should be able
to seek relief in order to preserve their opportunity to vote.
There remains a more difficult context of director-implemented
defensive tactics outside of a pending proxy fight or tender offer that signals
298. See, e.g., Belden Corp. v. Intemorth, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 98, 102 (111. App. Ct. 1980) (stating
that bidders who make an agreement with management "do not, however, have an unequi vcal right
to the benefits of the merger, since the power to approve the merger lies with the [target]
shareholders..."); cf. Great W. Producers Coop. v. Great W. United Corp., 613 P.2d 873 (Colo.
1980) (holding that a "best efforts" clause in a merger agreement was tempered by the directors'
duties under the general corporation law of the state).
299. Paramount Cormunications, 637 A.2d at 51.
300. Hilton Hotels Corp. v. 1IT Corp., 978 F. Supp. 1342, 1344 (D. Nev. 1997).
301. Id. at 1351.
302. Id. at 1346.
303. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
304. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
305. New York Stock Exchange rules required the approval of the original transaction by Time
shareholders. Delaware corporate law required the approval of Warner shareholders. Id. at 1146.
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shareholder action.306 A target board, having no other effective defensive
tactic, might be willing to take actions that would make the target so
unattractive to a potential bidder that shareholders would end up with a
company that was not worth very much. Shareholder self-help in sacred
space could address prospective harm, but there would be some possible
director actions that would be neither within that space nor tied to an alter-
native offer discussed above. And to the extent that sacred space forecloses
some director defensive tactics currently permitted, such as poison pills,
some directors may be more tempted to pursue such distasteful options. Here
there is no better alternative to judicial review, but what we are asking judges
to do in this setting should still be somewhat easier than what currently
occurs under the Unocal standard. A scorched-earth action may well be
severe enough that it comes within a traditional waste standard under which
courts have been willing to intrude into director action.
307
VII. Conclusion
Directors possess broad powers to make corporate decisions, including
decisions related to a takeover. Yet corporate law and theory require a role
for shareholders in fundamental changes and transactions in which the
directors may have a conflict. Even accounting for reasons not to prefer
shareholder decision-making for operational and other matters, there remains
a space for shareholder action. In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court went
in a different direction, focusing instead on a regime of enhanced judicial
scrutiny as the primary shareholder protection against director action taken in
a takeover setting to thwart shareholder selling or voting. It has not worked
as it was intended, primarily because of the difficulty of a third-party judge
separating director actions that may have an entrenchment motive from those
that could benefit the shareholders. The result is that defensive tactics are
almost never overturned by a court. A better alternative-based on insights
from the theory of the firm-is to permit direct shareholder action to vote
and to sell, and to enact antidotes to director actions that frustrate such
shareholder action within the space provided for them by corporate law.
306. See Larry Gurwin, The Scorched Earth Policy, THE INsTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, June 1979,
at 35 (highlighting alternative defensive tactics such as mud-slinging campaigns).
307. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) ("Roughly, a waste entails an
exchange of corporate assets for consideration so disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range
at which any reasonable person might be willing to trade.").
